



GeoThreat Report

The Cellular System of Hamas



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SAMPLE REPORT



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Overview

This report deconstructs a snapshot taken of the Hamas cellular system from 2001 to assess cellular effectiveness. To do this, a contextual history detailing the environment in which the cell operates will identify strategic, operational and cultural inflections followed by localising each component of cellular capital. In addition, the intent of this report is to formulate data for later analysis. There is some controversy over the definition of Palestinian people, however for this research they can be considered as any Arab with roots in historical Israel, regardless of religion¹. Additionally, references to the second Intifada throughout this report refers to the date range September 2000 to September 2003.

¹ 'Palestinian' retrieved 10 June 2003, from <http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian>

The Contextual History of Hamas

During December 1987, Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) used favourable political conditions to launch itself as both a reformist² and combatant Islamic Palestinian nationalist movement. The ensuing first and second *Intifadas* (uprising) produced evolutions in Israeli counter-terrorism policies and Hamas strategy, which have perpetuated the Palestinian conflict from 1987 – 2001. Figure 22 summarises some of the most significant milestones, from which will be constructed a relative historical framework.

Hamas' primary areas of operation comprise of Israel Proper (herein Israel), and the Israeli administered areas of East Jerusalem and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), consisting of the West Bank and Gaza strip. In mid-2001 both the West Bank and Gaza supported approximately 2.1 and 1.1 million Palestinians respectively³. The Gaza Strip is a key focus of unrest composed of a predominantly young Islamic population densely packed into an area of 365 square kilometres⁴. Co-located within this area are eight even more densely populated refugee camps accounting for approximately 400,000 people⁵. For example, the Jabaliya camp has 90,000 people living in a three-square kilometre area⁶. However, the West Bank is operationally just as important considering its proximity to Israel and Jordan. The Palestinian Diaspora comprises approximately 3.8 million Palestinians residing in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan with one third of this number residing in refugee camps⁷. Statistics indicate that since the start of the second *Intifada* Hamas has carried out approximately 61 attacks of which

² Mishal and Sela describe reformist in the Islamic sense as a long-term, bottom-up incremental process of social reforms combining both education and preaching with militancy. Source: Mishal, S. and Sela, A., *The Palestinian Hamas, Vision Violence, and Coexistence*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 29.

³ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - General Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/General_stat.htm

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ *ibid.*

9 percent occurred in Israel, 30 percent in the West Bank, 16 percent in Jerusalem and 14 percent in Gaza⁸.




Figure 1: Hamas Contextual History, 1987-2001

⁸ See Appendix B, 1st Search.

The first *Intifada* began on 8 December 1987. Essentially a 20-year Israeli occupation, a decline in the Palestinian economic situation and a new generation of Palestinian's uncowed by previous Arab defeats ignited a revolutionary uprising⁹. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) responded with mass arrests, detentions, assassinations¹⁰, punitive measures and deportations¹¹. Between December 1987 and December 1988, 311 Palestinians were killed, at least 50,000 arrested and 526 homes demolished¹². The signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993 essentially terminated the first *Intifada* granting Palestinians semi-autonomous rule (Palestinian Authority est. 25 May 1994 - PA)¹³. Oslo included the IDF redeployment from the Gaza - Jericho regions in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian police force¹⁴. The Cairo agreement followed in May 1994 committing the PA to the prevention of terrorist attacks from its controlled areas¹⁵. Inevitably, these territorial adjustments had a significant effect on Israel's counter-terrorism strategy.

Israel insulates its population from terrorism by projecting its counter-terrorism strategy into the OPT. Essentially, it remains a military led defensive strategy with offensive tactics favouring pre-emption while relying on HUMINT sources. Before the inception of the PA, the Israeli Security Forces (ISF) operated approximately 5,000 collaborators in the OPT, which following the Gaza redeployment the PA purged many¹⁶. Moreover, Usher comments that the '...emergence of an increasingly authoritarian PA has contributed to a process of depoliticization of Palestinian society in which many of its most able members have "collectively withdrawn", reverting to individualistic or clan

⁹ Hroub, K., *Hamas*, Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000, p. 36.

¹⁰ Abu jihad, Arafat's number two and believed to be controlling the first *Intifada* was assassinated by Israeli Security Forces.

Source: Bregman, A., *A History of Israel*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 261.

¹¹ Bregman, p. 218.

¹² Bregman, p. 220.

¹³ Bregman, p. 250.

¹⁴ Usher, G., 'The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services', *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, 25:2 (1996), pp. 21-34, p. 22.

¹⁵ Mishal and Sela, p. 70.

¹⁶ Usher, p. 25.

based (rather than political) solutions for their needs and aspirations.’¹⁷ Subsequently, Israel’s capacity to project its strategy has required adapting to the re-configuration of territory and subsequent changes in social networks.

The second *Intifada*, dubbed the *al-Aksa Intifada* in late 2000 resulted in an up-surge of violence out of which Ariel Sharon came to power in February 2001. Bregman comments in 2001 alone there were 1,794 terrorist attacks in Israel and the OPT causing 208 Israeli deaths and swinging public opinion away from a viable peace agreement with the Palestinians¹⁸. Overall, while Israel’s national strategy is broadly defensive, within the narrower counter-terrorism context it is offensive with a character somewhere between the extremes of full military force and border policing¹⁹. Subsequently, Hamas’ organisation has had to adapt rapidly to the intensive security environment in the OPT.

Hamas was co-founded by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin around 11 December 1987 on the back of the militant group Muslim Brotherhood (est. 1928 - MB), which supported the formation and association of Hamas to the first *Intifada*²⁰. The MB had emerged from Egypt as a Sunni reformist and communal Islamic movement seeking to create the ideal Islamic state using a passive grass roots approach²¹. Hamas signified a shift to political and national action from a communal stance²². Between 1987 and 1993, Hamas went through various organisational and operational changes in reaction to the changing security environment.

The outlawing of Hamas in 1989 and the following imprisonment of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin forced a shift in Hamas’ leadership structure from one run by a supreme leader

¹⁷ Usher, p. 32.

¹⁸ Bregman, p. 285.

¹⁹ Usher, p. 28.

²⁰ Hroub, p. 40.

²¹ Mishal and Sela, p. 120.

²² Mishal and Sela, p. 37.

and visionary, to one run by liberal professionals²³. During November 1992, Hamas announced it had entered into a strategic relationship with Iran²⁴. Israeli security officers had previously described Hamas as: ‘A surprisingly unprofessional bunch, they had no training, and acted without specific instructions.’²⁵ Iran provided funds, weapons and training and most importantly, direction in building covert intangible networks²⁶. Israel’s crackdown on Hamas in 1992 resulted in the exile of some 415 leaders from December 1992 to December 1993. This event highlighted the importance of using external control measures to maintain operational compartmentalization²⁷. Consequently, Hamas’ top leadership transferred to Jordan and Syria necessitating the re-structuring of Hamas’ military wing.

Salah Shahadeh, a co-founder of Hamas, was instrumental in establishing Hamas’ initial *al-Qassam* military wing using compartmentalised cells, each allocated to particular territorial zones and reporting to a supreme command²⁸. Hamas’ former MB members were already familiar with cellular systems, including the concept of compartmentalization following their deployment before the first *Intifada*²⁹. During 1992 the *al-Qassam* elements transitioned from a guerrilla based operational structure of six man units into the *Martyr Izzidin al-Qassam* Brigades (herein al-Qassam Brigades) of operational cells regionally assigned and controlled by local battalion commanders³⁰. While events in 1992 acted as catalysts for relocation and re-organisation, from 1993 onwards Hamas’ military strategy escalated. The first suicide attack by Hamas in April 1993 signalled the use of a Hizbullah based strategy adopted

²³ Katz, S., *The Hunt for the Engineer: How Israeli Agents Tracked the Hamas Master Bomber*, New York: Fromm International, 1999, p. 51.

²⁴ O’Ballance, E., *Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979-95: The Iranian Connection*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997, p. 166.

²⁵ O’Ballance, p. 167.

²⁶ Katz, p. 52.

²⁷ Eshel, D., ‘Hamas Resists Pressure as Israel Targets Arafat’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, 14:1 (2002), pp 12-15, p. 13.

²⁸ Eshel, p. 14.

²⁹ Hroub, p. 35.

³⁰ Katz, p. 56.

in Lebanon during the early 1980s against Israel and the United States led multinational force³¹. Suicide bombings and other forms of attack targeted Israeli settlers and security personnel until February 1994 when a right-wing Israeli settler entered the Abraham Mosque in Hebron killing and wounding numerous worshippers³². Hebron provided the political opportunity to escalate Hamas' strategy through the sanctioned targeting of all Israeli citizens³³. Rather than describing this shift as a tit-for-tat policy, it represented a re-alignment towards its end goal of liberating Palestine through attacks that exhausted and weakened Israel³⁴, and de-legitimised the PA leadership³⁵. Hroub describes this as a strategy of force, however it is more accurate to describe it as a strategy of attrition considering Hamas' strategic goal³⁶.

The historical framework ending in 2001 offsets an Israeli offensive strategy against Hamas' strategy of attrition. Moreover, this framework identifies Hamas' adoption of the cellular system as being indicative of long-term survivability as a requirement of its strategy. The next three sections will use this framework to assist in the deconstruction of the Hamas cellular system. See Appendix A for research definitions associated with the following three sections.

³¹ Mishal and Sela, p. 66.

³² O'Ballance, p. 174.

³³ Hroub, p. 246.

³⁴ Hroub, p. 247.

³⁵ Mishal and Sela, p. 140.

³⁶ Hroub, p. 80.

The Main Actors of Hamas

In 2001, Hamas' organisational structure reflected a four-tier construct (see Figure 23) with regionally divided parallel leadership frameworks. This section will first examine the organisational structure of the Hamas cell and second, the actors that influence it.

The cells of the al-Qassam Brigades are territorially compartmentalised within the OPT and Jerusalem. These regions may shift in and out of activity, however Eshel lists the following active regions as of 2002. The West Bank regions are: Samaria, which includes Jenin, Nablus, Tubas and additionally Tul Qarem and Qalkiliya in the Northern West Bank; Jerusalem, which includes Ramallah and Jericho; and Hebron, which includes Bethlehem. Gaza sector operations comprise Gaza South, Gaza North, Khan Yhunis and Rafa³⁷. The Hamas cell is organised into four specific structures, internal security cells, strike cells, support cells and martyrdom cells³⁸.

Hamas' internal security cells (*majid*) operate under their own regional command apparatus. *Majid* cells comprise of between two and three operatives designated with multiple internal security roles including, collecting intelligence on informers and enforcing Islamic moral codes of conduct³⁹. Moreover, they may also act as couriers between the various layers of leadership⁴⁰.

Regional strike cells comprise of four to five members, each with a commander and usually an executive officer⁴¹. Strike cells operate in attack roles and

³⁷ Eshel, p. 14.

³⁸ Mishel and Sela, Hroub, and Eshel each provide details of Hamas' internal structure. However, information on Hamas cells lacks clarity regarding actual operational interactions. Consequently, a degree of interpretation is incorporated into this analysis.

³⁹ Alexander, Y., *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad*, Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc, 2002, p. 12.

⁴⁰ Mishal and Sela, p. 158.

⁴¹ Katz, p. 116.

sometimes intelligence roles⁴². For example, attacks that require infiltration into Israel may require separate intelligence cells to gather information whereas the regional strike cell may collect information for local attacks.

Both logistics and operational intelligence cells have had very little written regarding their structure and operation. However, Hamas' use of cross-border and under-border supply chains, weapons labs and its various attacks in Israel, indicates the existence of specialised cells, which are most likely small cells of between two and three operatives⁴³. Moreover, Eshel differentiates between regional and functional cells as well as describing a logistics component in the regional leadership structure⁴⁴. However, Mishal and Sela comment that local activists are '...encouraged to accept broader responsibilities and commitments than those prescribed by their role descriptions.'⁴⁵ Subsequently, this implies that some specialised cells⁴⁶ may shift in and out of other roles as and when needed. For example, an IDF report describes the capture of a two-man East Jerusalem Hamas intelligence cell, which in addition to collecting intelligence had also planted explosives⁴⁷.

Martyrdom cells come together for each attack and comprise of two elements under the control of a cell commander. The support element consists of two to three members and the *shaheed al hay* (living martyr) element consists of from one to three⁴⁸ trained living

⁴² Katz, p. 56.

⁴³ The small size of logistics and intelligence cells would indicate their specialised nature and defensive orientation vis-à-vis strike cells.

⁴⁴ Eshel, p. 14.

⁴⁵ Mishal and Sela, p. 160.

⁴⁶ There is no indication in the literary sources that logistics cells shifted into strike roles.

⁴⁷ Israel Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports, 'Security Forces Capture Terrorist Cell Involved in Massive Terrorist Attacks in Jerusalem' retrieved 2 September 2003, from <http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/pigua1.stm>

⁴⁸ The number of living martyr's is an estimate based on events extracted from the ICT Internet database. Moreover, the ICT database does not differentiate between mainstream shootings and martyrdom shootings. However, one can make the argument that some of these infiltration and shooting operations of Israeli settlements were most likely martyrdom operations considering the modus operandi of the attacks, such as no apparent exit strategies, and some being single shooter events (see Appendix B for a summary of ICT events).

martyrs⁴⁹. The support element provides the weaponry, organises transportation, fake paperwork and disguises⁵⁰ and disbands following the operation⁵¹.

Hamas' internal leadership comprises parallel and identical regional commands informally subordinated to either Gaza or West Bank head quarters (herein Gaza-West Bank headquarters) and informally subordinated to the external leadership⁵². Regional headquarters are composed of committees, including security, logistics, public relations, welfare and recruitment⁵³.

The regional military command informally affiliates itself to the other committees to safeguard its secrecy⁵⁴. The military command directs the regional al-Qassam brigade and is composed of a battalion or regional commander who has overall responsibility for the strike and martyrdom cells. Eshel lists four regional commands including the Northern West Bank or Samaria, Jerusalem, Hebron and those in Gaza⁵⁵. Eshel also indicates the existence of a Palestinian operational command layer between the external and the Gaza-West Bank leadership⁵⁶. However, its role remains too unclear to expand on further⁵⁷.

Hamas' external leadership is a formal hierarchical structure organised into a political bureau or executive body of from 10 – 12 members and an informal

⁴⁹ Moghadam, A., 'Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organisational Aspects', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26:2 (2003), pp. 65-92, p. 85.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² Eshel, p. 14 and Mishal and Sela, Appendix 1 and Katz, p. 35.

⁵³ Eshel, p. 14.

⁵⁴ Mishal and Sela, Appendix 1.

⁵⁵ Eshel, p. 15.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*

⁵⁷ Eshel gives no indication of the Palestinian Operation commands purpose, although its position indicates a coordinating role. Due to the lack of information, it has been left out of this analysis in favour of a link directly between the Gaza-West Bank and external leadership.

advisory council of approximately 12 members⁵⁸. The advisory council acts as the supreme religious legislative authority providing ‘...normative backing and moral justification for Hamas’ political conduct and major decisions.’⁵⁹ A chairman oversees the executive, which manages various committees including, foreign affairs, finance, propaganda, internal security and military affairs⁶⁰. The leadership operates from both Jordan and Syria⁶¹. In contrast to Hamas’ organisational construct, popular support acts to support the Hamas cell.

Most terrorist organisations strive for popular support and attempt to maximise it through their strategy⁶². However, Hamas is only dependent on securing a strong Palestinian support base to insulate its military apparatus against PA and Israeli counter-terrorism measures in order to maintain its attrition strategy. The armed struggle becomes critical in this sense as a means to generate support. Popular support then becomes a barometer of prevailing conditions acting as an indicator in calculating political opportunity for particular acts. Consequently, popular support primarily influences leadership and recruitment. While popular support remains a crucial target audience for Hamas, Palestinian prisoners provide symbolic encouragement and informal leadership.

Palestinian prisoners play both a symbolic and organisational role in cell effectiveness. The Israeli human rights organisation *B’tselem* estimated that on 3 October 2002 2,755 Palestinians were being detained by the IDF and 1,306 were imprisoned by the Israeli Prison Service⁶³. Palestinian prisoners are a visible symbol of Israeli repression, commonly associated to torture, unfair trials and long periods of detention without

⁵⁸ Katz, p. 51.

⁵⁹ Mishal and Sela, p. 161.

⁶⁰ Mishal and Sela, Appendix 1.

⁶¹ *ibid.*

⁶² Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Part in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 45.

⁶³ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Arrests, Imprisonment and Torture Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Arrests_torture_stat.htm

arrest (administrative detention)⁶⁴. Hamas has shown solidarity by establishing prisoner committees ‘... established to support prisoners’ families financially, paying for detainee’s legal defence, and transferring “canteen money” to jails.’⁶⁵ Mishal and Sela also identify imprisoned Hamas leaders as forming an internal HQ by using their personal acquaintances with local militants to exert influence⁶⁶. However, how effective this link remains is unknown. Consequently, prisoners mainly act as propaganda influencing popular support. While prisoners are useful for their symbolic value, spiritual leaders offer Hamas operatives religious justification for their actions.

Spiritual leaders provide religious and ideological justification for many of Hamas’ activities. They influence Hamas operatives in the following three ways. First, spiritual leaders dispense their ideological message through public prayers and sermons⁶⁷. Second, Islamic clerics issue *fatwas*⁶⁸ to rule on religiously inspired acts such as martyrdom operations⁶⁹. Third, some have become symbols of the Palestinian struggle, such as Hamas’ spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin⁷⁰. Consequently, spiritual leaders are highly influential in managing commitment. The influence of a spiritual leader such as Yassin becomes a significant draw in an operating environment with various ideological flavours.

⁶⁴ Amnesty International USA, ‘Israel and the Occupied Territories’, (1999) retrieved 3 May 2003, from http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/Israel_and_occupied_territories/document.do?id=22C55s99DEBD DC5F802568E400729F04

⁶⁵ Mishal and Sela, p. 158.

⁶⁶ Mishal and Sela, Appendix 1.

⁶⁷ Neusse, A., *Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998, p. 176.

⁶⁸ A *fatwa* is a ‘Decision of a religious scholar on a matter of Islamic law.’

Source: Armstrong, K., *Islam: A Short History*, New York: Random House Inc, 2000, p. 200.

⁶⁹ Mishal and Sela, p. 77.

⁷⁰ Eshel, p. 15.

The large array of rejectionist organisations operating in and around the OPT provides varying degrees of competition for popular support and recruits. There are a myriad of organisations militarily active including, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah-Intifada and the Lebanese based Hizbullah⁷¹. Each has various ideological tints and some have strategic relationships with one another. For example, Fatah-Intifada and PIJ have relationships with Hizbullah and Hamas⁷². The interaction between these organisations presents exit opportunities for Hamas members. For example, Hamas discovered Hizbullah recruiting Hamas recruits sent to Hizbullah training camps in Lebanon⁷³. Consequently, competing and strategically aligned rejectionist organisations influence the lifecycle of the Hamas operative (see Figure 30).

Popular support, spiritual leadership and the organisational construct represent major actors of the Hamas cell. Other rejectionist organisations and prisoners are minor actors being somewhat less influential but remain vital actors of the overall cellular system. These actors represent the major sources of dynamic influences shaping the Hamas organisation. The following six sections further project the influence of each actor as each component of cell effectiveness is localised.

⁷¹ In addition, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) also operate in the OPT.

Source: Strindberg, A., 'Intifada Revives Rejectionist Factions', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 14:7 (2002), pp 24-26, p. 24.

⁷² Strindberg, p. 24.

⁷³ Gambill, G., 'Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 4:10 (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from http://www.meib.org/articles/0210_s1.htm



The Cellular System of Hamas




Figure 2: Actors influencing the Hamas Cellular System

Compartmentalization and Islam

This section primarily examines solidarity and how it shapes internal compartmentalization (see Figure 24). In addition, both operational and territorial compartmentalization are each addressed when examining communications discipline. These factors assist in shaping the cells secrecy, which contributes to cell effectiveness. Within a Hamas cell, solidarity has the following primary bonding characteristics: prior experiences of repression and violence, symbolism and the Islamic institution.

Hamas membership comprises a broad social class of Palestinians who have experienced varying degrees of Israeli repression and PA civic violations. Refugee camps and urban slums in particular have become centres of impoverishment with both high population densities and rates of unemployment⁷⁴. For example, following the start of the second *Intifada*, the unemployment rate in Gaza rose to 50 percent due to Israeli security closures⁷⁵. Clashes with the ISF, which have resulted in approximately 8,177 Palestinians casualties, have further exacerbated economic pressure⁷⁶. Moreover, civic violations carried out by PA security forces including mass arrests, illegal abductions, detentions and torture further amplify Israeli mistreatment⁷⁷. The systemic extent that repression and violence develop common prior experiences is in contrast to the systematic and orchestrated symbolism generated by Hamas.

Prisoners, funerals and acts of martyrdom are each used as symbols of identity and defiance in the armed struggle. Martyrs symbolise self-sacrifice and acts of revenge against the systematic humiliation of the Palestinian people developing inspiration and

⁷⁴ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Closures, Unemployment and Poverty Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Closures_stat.htm

⁷⁵ Moghadam, p. 75.

⁷⁶ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Killing and Injury Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Killings_stat.htm

⁷⁷ Usher, p. 32.

unity through glorification, such as the common depiction of martyrs on posters⁷⁸. The martyrdom operation, the martyr and funeral each act to embolden Hamas supporters and operatives⁷⁹. Funerals orchestrated to inject both patriotism and defiance into its participants symbolise both the Palestinian and Islamic identity using symbolic props, such as the Palestinian flag⁸⁰. While symbolism energises the solidarity of Hamas operatives, Islam adds a constant source of common interest.

Islam, as an institution, lies in a single god and unified *ummah* (community) governed by justice and equity.⁸¹ It defines a broad range of cultural ideals including ritual, worship and social norms centred on five pillars incumbent on all believers, consisting of faith, prayer, almsgiving, fasting and pilgrimage⁸². Neusse states, ‘Qutb⁸³] and the Hamas-activists both view Islam as a distinct historical totality that permeates and rules every dimension of life.’⁸⁴ In this sense, Hamas’ traditionalist⁸⁵ discourse has unified its members producing a common identity, which preaches the principle of *jihad* as a sense of duty devolved upon individual Muslims⁸⁶. Subsequently, common interest is continually reinforced through the five pillars of Islam. These strong social bonds within the Hamas cell seem to suggest a high degree of discipline.

⁷⁸ Dolnik, A and Bhattacharjee, A., ‘Hamas: Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD?’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14:3 (2002), pp 109-128, p. 115.

⁷⁹ Hroub, p. 247.

⁸⁰ Litvak, M., *The Islamization of Palestinian Identity: The Case of Hamas*, Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1996, p. 10.

⁸¹ Armstrong, p. 8.

⁸² Esposito, J. L., *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 35.

⁸³ Qutb refers to Sayyid Qutb, an important MB theorist who preached a revolutionary top down approach to Islamic reform using the basis of a holy war to achieve these ends rather than the reformist and militant bottom-up approach used by Hamas.

Source: Mishal and Sela, p. 29.

⁸⁴ Neusse, p. 87.

⁸⁵ The traditionalist discourse is a product of the Islamist movement, which intends to renew the comprehension of Islam by leaning towards its more conservative aspects. The traditionalist framework more easily fits in with the uneducated fringe whose priority tends to be following a religious code. Subsequently, the unifying expression *Allah Akhbar* (God is greatest) signifies both defiance and rejection to Islamist followers.

Source: Burgat, F and Dowell, W., *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, Austin, Texas: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1997, pp. 9-19.

⁸⁶ Mishal and Sela, p. 50.

The 'need to know' philosophy determined the extent of the operative's discipline⁸⁷. Figures extracted from IDF⁸⁸ and International Centre for Terrorism (ICT)⁸⁹ reports identify no more than six Hamas cells dismantled since the start of the second *Intifada*⁹⁰. Additionally, ICT Figures show most arrests or fatalities involved leaders identified through intelligence sources, whereas militants were identified through both intercepts and intelligence sources with generally no more than two militants at a time being engaged⁹¹. Katz comments that the arrest and interrogation of one cell member would only lead to the arrest of the other cell members essentially because they maintained operations within their own enclosed community⁹². Both Katz and Moghadam comment that martyrdom missions in particular utilise strict communications discipline in which each member of the martyrdom cell only interacts with the cell commander⁹³. Moreover, low-levels of coercion and Hamas' communications infrastructure reinforce communications discipline.

⁸⁷ See Appendix A Commitment, for a definition of the 'need to know' philosophy.

⁸⁸ The IDF chronology of counter-terrorism operations in the OPT, between 2002 and 2003 indicates approximately 250 Hamas operatives were arrested or killed. The security reports from which these Figures are derived are inconsistent in presentation and lack detail. For example, the roles of most Hamas operatives that are captured are not identified. The capture of a Hamas supporter that works for the welfare apparatus will have a different impact to one who operates in logistics. Moreover, other Figures such as numbers of thwarted attacks appear to link the capture of one Hamas supporter to one attack, which is rather dubious.

Source: Israel Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports retrieved 2 September 2003, from <http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/dailyevents.stm>

⁸⁹ ICT reports for counter-terrorism operations and targeted killings between January 2001 and August 2003 shows approximately 100 Hamas operatives were arrested or killed. The discrepancy with IDF Figures is difficult to quantify (see previous note), however ICT Figures are verified with multiple sources and consequently are used in preference to IDF Figures.

Source: International Centre for Terrorism (ICT) Database retrieved 1 September 2003, from http://www.ict.org.il/casualties_project/incidentsearch.cfm

⁹⁰ While this Figure appears low, the structure of Hamas' cellular system interacting with Israeli counter-terrorism measures tends to favour this causal result. For example, Hamas' tendency for martyrdom attacks reduces the visibility of the cell and only exposes the attack elements at the time of the attack. In other cases, it suggests cell members remained dispersed until it becomes a necessity to re-form. Overall, this would tend to favour leaders and individual militants being targeted by Israeli counter-terrorism measures.

⁹¹ *ibid.*

⁹² Katz, p. 35.

⁹³ Moghadam, p. 86 and Katz, p. 200.

Majd cells act as clear and present deterrents by tracking down and punishing informers. Schbley comments that, ‘...the culting process of religious terrorism restricts or discourages cell elements’ unchaperoned contact with outsiders in order to sustain their indoctrination and maintain their commitment.’⁹⁴ In addition, Hamas has instituted a full range of communication methods passing encrypted messages using couriers, multiple drop points and pre-programmed cellular phones, all of which territorially and operationally insulate cell members⁹⁵. Overall, the targeting of operatives rather than whole cells and an entrenched ‘need to know’ philosophy within the cellular system suggests effective communications discipline at lower levels. Subsequently, when considering Israeli success in targeting Hamas leadership the efficacy of the ‘need to know’ philosophy becomes arguably weaker at higher levels.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for compartmentalization:

1. Leadership flexibility achieved through consultation sustains the *jihad* within Hamas cells, which reinforces solidarity
2. Internal leadership allowed the semi-autonomous operation of Hamas cells following the leadership’s target selection. The decentralisation of control for operational purposes generated pride and reinforced solidarity following successful attacks
3. Ineffective over reaction by security forces increases commitment, which increases solidarity
4. Hamas’ integration into the Palestinian community produced pockets of popular support, which increased attack effectiveness and reinforced solidarity
5. Recruitment filtering reinforces solidarity through common experience
6. The effectiveness of *majd* cells in disrupting Israeli informer networks helped enforce communications discipline
7. Effective operational intelligence, abundant weaponry and tactical variety increased attack effectiveness, which reinforced solidarity

⁹⁴ Schbley, A., ‘Defining Religious Terrorism: A Causal and Anthological Profile’, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26:2 (2003), pp. 105-134, p. 119.

⁹⁵ Eshel, D., ‘Israel Hones Intelligence Operations to Counter Intifada’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, October (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

8. Israeli counter-terrorism measures increased the isolation of cells, which increased solidarity

The compartmentalization of a Hamas cell suggests a well-founded solidarity and entrenched communications discipline reinforced by feedback influences which, primarily through counter-terrorism measures, attack effectiveness and decentralisation of control, adjusts to the changing security environment. Any disciplinary weakness appears somewhat confined to the leadership apparatus. Consequently, the Hamas cell supports a high degree of secrecy and therefore positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.




Figure 3: Hamas Systems Decomposition of Compartmentalization

Leadership and Hamas Strongholds

This section primarily examines the leadership's role in determining decentralisation of control (see Figure 25). In addition, selective targeting is examined as a manifestation of the organisation's strategy and subsequently, the survivability of the Hamas cell. These factors focus on leadership influences that shape cell formation and operation, both of which help determine cell effectiveness.

Hamas' four-tier leadership structure suggests a moderate degree of decentralisation of control. Leadership centralisation determines stability and subsequently, the manifestation of ideology into strategy influencing the decentralisation of operational control. Essentially, leadership stability is dependent on leadership proximity to the war-zone and composition. Hamas' external leadership structure is split between Damascus and Amman⁹⁶. Secondary offices crucial to Hamas operation's are maintained in Tehran and Beirut. Syrian and to a lesser extent Jordanian sponsorship⁹⁷ since the mid 1990s allow bases geographically proximate to the OPT, permitting strategic planning and command and control (C²) of military and logistical activities to be administered⁹⁸. However, Hamas' external executive committee does not culturally reflect Hamas internally⁹⁹.

Many of Hamas' external leaders are relatively young, liberal professionals with advanced degrees, recruited from outside the organisation¹⁰⁰. Subsequently, they have deviated to some degree from Yassin's original approach of Islamic revelation to a more revolutionary top-down approach of Islamic reform¹⁰¹. Moreover, this difference has been somewhat amplified by their detachment from Palestinian suffering and

⁹⁶ Alexander, p. 11.

⁹⁷ Jordanian sponsorship has been steadily declining since Hamas offices were ordered closed in 1999. Source: 'Jordan Strikes at Hamas', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 1:9 (1999) retrieved 1 May 2003, from http://www.meib.org/articles/9909_me2.htm

⁹⁸ Gambill, Internet.

⁹⁹ Neusse, p. 22.

¹⁰⁰ Mishal and Sela, p. 161.

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*

subsequent difficulty in judging the mood of the Palestinian people¹⁰². Consequently, both the proximity of external leadership to the OPT and its composition have contributed to a degree of leadership instability leading to some factionalisation¹⁰³. In this sense, Hamas' tier leadership structure has amplified external leadership C² issues and the management of strategy.

The Hamas strategy connects abstract beliefs from its religious-nationalist ideology with concrete actions, which influence the continuing degree of decentralisation of control. Hamas' attrition strategy uses controlled violence to balance Israeli overreaction with maximising its own popular support base. Controlled violence is determined by the geographical boundaries and targeting direction of the strategy.

Concentrations of Hamas support produce areas of operation, which provide safe havens to house various levels of headquarters for coordinating military operations¹⁰⁴. However, the boundaries of these areas do not inherently overlap with all areas of operation, such as those in Jerusalem and Israel. Subsequently, the strategic designation of geographical boundaries can influence targeting direction.

Targeting direction sets the tempo of attacks (strategic tempo) using a blend of religious and nationalist influences, which influences the use of rational calculation¹⁰⁵. Hamas' predilection for controlled violence necessitates a cost benefit analysis regarding targeting decisions¹⁰⁶. This analysis assesses public mood, political opportunity and the

¹⁰² *ibid.*

¹⁰³ 'Hamas Divided Against Self', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 1:6 (1999) retrieved 1 May 2003, from http://www.meib.org/articles/9906_me2.htm

¹⁰⁴ For example, Gaza refugee camps are considered blind spots for the ISFs because of their violent, overcrowded and economically depressed states and intimate social networks. Source: 'Israel Turns to the Gaza Strip', *Jane's Foreign Report*, October 24 (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://frp.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

¹⁰⁵ Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 125.

¹⁰⁶ O'Brien, K and Lev, I., 'Information Operations and Counterterrorism', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

adverse consequences of particular attacks, such as martyrdom operations¹⁰⁷. For example, the Islamic concept of *sabr* (self-restraint and patience) is used to justify strategic tempo and policy adjustments¹⁰⁸. Consequently, leadership centralisation, primarily its proximity to the war-zone, and the attrition strategy emphasising controlled violence, are crucial factors for determining the decentralisation of control.

The decentralisation of control correlates to the maintenance of organisational cohesion and flexibility. Mishal and Sela, Gambil, and Kristianasen each comment respectively on Hamas' unclear chain of command¹⁰⁹, the difference in external leadership control between the West Bank and Gaza¹¹⁰ and regional enclaves of self-rule¹¹¹. These comments suggest a '...diminished ability of Hamas' senior leaders to maintain control over the rank and file...'¹¹². Mishal and Sela list seven leadership directives used to address these issues, which are summarised as follows:

- Local members are encouraged to accept broader responsibilities
- Decisions are driven more by interaction among peers
- Increased horizontal interaction between peers, which includes information gathering and communicating across different local positions
- Commitment to tasks is devolved to the individual rather than the loyalty of the leadership¹¹³

A significant theme of these characteristics is the consultative nature in which control is applied, which within a climate of regional isolation has heightened the status of local Hamas members¹¹⁴. In addition, family and traditional ties and proximity to Mosques¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁷ Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 115.

¹⁰⁸ Mishal and Sela, p. 64.

¹⁰⁹ Mishal and Sela, p. 82.

¹¹⁰ Gambil, Internet.

¹¹¹ Kristianasen, W., 'Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 28:3 (1999), pp. 19-36, p. 23.

¹¹² Mishal and Sela, p. 159.

¹¹³ Mishal and Sela, p. 160.

¹¹⁴ Mishal and Sela, p. 159.

¹¹⁵ Mishal and Sela, p. 152.

combined with a regular turnover of internal leaders¹¹⁶ has widened the gap between external and internal leadership resulting in local power centres forming¹¹⁷. Consequently, local initiatives have sometimes contradicted external leadership direction to ensure local control¹¹⁸. However, this trend to local power centres tends to be tactical rather than ideological¹¹⁹. Hamas' internal regional command structures, including the Gaza-West Bank headquarters and their subordinate regional or sector headquarters are the key constructs of power centres, which ultimately decide the decentralisation of control to Hamas cells. Katz comments that, in the case of Martyrdom operations, Damascus transmitted encrypted orders directly to specific regional West Bank headquarters, which then selected an appropriate Hamas cell for the operation¹²⁰. Regional headquarters would, if requested, provide extra logistical supplies such as explosives¹²¹. Moreover, Katz comments that Ayyash 'the engineer', a battalion commander, would not activate martyrdom operations on his own initiative but '...was permanently at a traffic stop waiting for either the red or green light.' Once given the green light the battalion commander controlled the details of each attack¹²². Therefore, Hamas cells received attack orders and would then act semi-autonomously barring any need for extra logistical support¹²³.

Overall, the high degree of operational control devolved to the regional headquarters is summarised as strategic guidance with tactical independence. However, a lesser degree

¹¹⁶ Between January 2001 and August 2003 at least 34 leaders including cell commanders, battalion commanders and senior leaders of the Gaza-West Bank headquarters have been captured or killed by the Israeli Security Forces.

Source: See Appendix B, 3rd Search.

¹¹⁷ Kristianasen, p. 24.

¹¹⁸ Mishal and Sela, p. 159.

¹¹⁹ Mishal and Sela, p. 160.

¹²⁰ Katz, p. 200.

¹²¹ *ibid.*

¹²² Kushner, H., 'Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 19:4 (1996), pp. 329-337, p. 334.

¹²³ There is some reference to Hamas cells operating rogue, however the tactics of Hamas, such as infiltrations, ambushes, rocket attacks and martyrdom operations require specific logistical support which arguably subordinates them to regional and Gaza-West Bank headquarters.

Source: Mishal and Sela, p. 159.

of operational control devolved from regional headquarters to Hamas cells reflects the construct of regional power centres. Logistical coercion and consultations between commanders maintain each layer of control¹²⁴. Overall, external leadership as Gambill comments retains supremepower through the ‘power of the purse’, a crucial gambit in securing subordinate control¹²⁵.

Hamas’ multiple state sponsors, sympathisers and relationships with foreign and local organisations allow for the exchange of ideas, training, recruitment and attachment to supply sources. However, the forte of Hamas’ external leadership is in raising funds from abroad using an extensive network of representatives. For example, representatives maintain links in the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and many other Arab countries¹²⁶. Overall, decentralisation of control generates cohesion, however it also overlaps somewhat with selective targeting and the survivability of the cell.

Targeting limitations govern targeting selection but implicit in the cost-benefit analysis of selection is the attacks ability to compel *jihad* within and outside the organisation. Within this framework, targeting can be categorised into high, low and symbolic levels of profiling.

High profile targeting transmits Hamas’ ideological message, demonstrates its commitment and intends to guarantee a disproportionate response. Hamas’ high profile targets are groups of Israeli citizens and individual informers. The most precious asset

¹²⁴ The following summarises Hamas’ process of decentralisation of control: Hamas’ devolution of control proceeds through three layers of a four-tier leadership structure. The first layer exists between the external and Gaza-West Bank internal leadership. The second layer exists between the Gaza-West Bank leadership and their associated regional commanders. The third layer exists between regional and cell commanders. The devolution of control is premised on attack authorisations. For example, martyrdom operations require authorisation by at least the Gaza-West Bank internal commanders and consultation with external leadership. Mainstream attacks, such as local ambushes, are authorised by regional commanders. The local Hamas cell has some attack autonomy based on regional authorisation for the attack. Both logistical coercion and consultations between commanders maintain these layers.

¹²⁵ Gambill, Internet.

¹²⁶ Alexander, p. 9.

of Israel is its citizens and attacks upon them influence Israeli government programs such as immigration¹²⁷. Since the start of the second *Intifada* Hamas has inflicted approximately 343 Israeli fatalities through direct targeting, with the majority either Israeli citizens or settlers¹²⁸. Martyrdom bombings are responsible for approximately 80 percent of these fatalities¹²⁹. In contrast, informer complicity in ISF operations, such as targeted killings, produce fear and uncertainty within the organisation threatening its cohesion¹³⁰. A recent study by Radlauer shows that 32 of the 1,900 Palestinian deaths since the start of the second *Intifada* are suspected Palestinian informers¹³¹.

Low profile targeting through the systematic targeting of Israeli settlers maintains Hamas' strategic tempo and public visibility¹³². Of the 343 Israeli fatalities attributed to Hamas approximately 16 percent were killed in the OPT suggesting settler targets¹³³. The nineteen Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip contribute .6 percent (6,900) of the Gaza population whereas in the West Bank, approximately 180 Israeli settlements contribute some ten percent (208,000) to the West Bank population¹³⁴. These targets are the most readily available for Hamas operatives and symbolise short-term objectives that Palestinians can relate too, such as impeding Zionist expansion¹³⁵.

Symbolic targeting projects a message of power to specific audiences. Martyrdom operations targeting Israeli social, leisure and educational facilities, such as malls and

¹²⁷ Hroub, p. 247.

¹²⁸ See Appendix B, 1st Search.

¹²⁹ *ibid.*

¹³⁰ Blanche, E., 'Israel Uses Intifada Informers to Abet Assassination Campaigns', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December (2001) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

¹³¹ Further breakdowns of informers by rejectionist organisation were not provided.

¹³² While there are approximately three Israeli soldiers for every four settlers in Gaza, they appear rarely targeted directly. Those that are killed in most cases have initiated action against Hamas. Consequently, they are not included as a low-priority target.

Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - Settlement Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Settlements_stat.htm

¹³³ Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Official Statistics retrieved 2 September 2003, from http://www.idf.il/english/news/jump_2_eng_300900.stm

¹³⁴ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - Settlement Statistics, Internet.

¹³⁵ Hroub, p. 249.

nightclubs, send messages of commitment, power and vulnerability to Hamas' Israeli audience and provide inspiration and legitimisation of its cause to its Palestinian audience¹³⁶. Qassam-2¹³⁷ rocket attacks on Israeli cities demonstrate Hamas' restrained capabilities through its long-range threat potential and the organisations ability to innovate technically¹³⁸. Moreover, these attacks also increase Hamas' prestige among the competing rejectionist organisations. Ultimately, symbolic targeting somewhat remedies the diminishing returns of using the same tactics¹³⁹.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for leadership:

1. Local leaders can more accurately assess local conditions by using popular support as a barometer
2. Targeted killings of internal leadership disrupts Hamas both psychologically and operationally (-)

In summary, the internal leadership takes a pragmatic approach whereas the external leadership sets the tone for Hamas strategy to control the violence¹⁴⁰. Islamic concepts and Hamas' nationalist discourse control the strategy and allow the adjustment of ideological dogma, and incorporate limitations and rationalisations into selective targeting. While counter-terrorism measures disrupt internal leadership to some degree, the organisation's horizontal and regional partitions insulate the various regional power centres from one another. Overall, leadership positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.

¹³⁶ Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 115.

¹³⁷ Qassam-II statistics: Range 10-12 Km, 4-6 Kg explosive charge

Source: Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 116.

¹³⁸ Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 117.

¹³⁹ Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 114.

¹⁴⁰ Gambill, Internet.




Figure 4: Hamas Systems Decomposition of Leadership

Commitment and Jihad

This section primarily examines the ideology of Hamas and to what extent it translates into commitment (see Figure 26). In this analysis, Hamas' interpretation of *jihad* represents a central motivating factor of cell effectiveness.

Hamas recognises the importance of controlling the use of symbolic rewards to provide justifications for objectives and engender commitment to varying degrees of action¹⁴¹. Most rejectionist organisations operating in the OPT maintain the following objectives: the ending of Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and an equitable solution to the Palestinian refugee problem¹⁴². Hamas to justify these objectives and appeal to a broader audience, incorporates a nationalist discourse into its core Islamic ideology, which defines it as a Palestinian rather than Islamic movement¹⁴³. However, to validate this belief structure, Hamas assimilates many ideas through the Islamisation of the conflict.

Islamisation contextualises ideas in purely Islamic thought¹⁴⁴. Subsequently, Hamas has been able to incorporate modern western concepts, such as political pluralism, into its discourse using historical manipulation. For example, the role of the Ottoman empire perceived by Arab nationalist historiography as responsible for Arab decline is recast as responsible for the restoration of Islamic political unity and as protection from western encroachment¹⁴⁵. The theme of foreign conquest persists through the Islamisation of the *Intifada*, which is depicted as a *jihad* and as a last link in a long chain of holy wars for the sake of Islam¹⁴⁶. By drawing on Islamised images and events from the past Hamas presents a means to understand the religious character of the conflict¹⁴⁷.

¹⁴¹ Mishal and Sela, p. 153.

¹⁴² Strindberg, p. 26.

¹⁴³ Litvak, p. 7.

¹⁴⁴ Litvak, p. 4.

¹⁴⁵ Litvak, p. 16.

¹⁴⁶ Litvak, p. 17.

¹⁴⁷ Mishal and Sela, p. 52.

Islamisation is an essential concept viewing Islam as a historical totality that has institutionalised everyday lives producing a natural Islamic identity. The Islamic identity is as Litvak comments, re-contextualised in the struggle against colonisation or the struggle between Islam and Judaism¹⁴⁸. Subsequently, Hamas' appeal to Palestinian patriotism is extolled as part of the Islamic belief system. Within this religious framework Hamas' interpretation of *jihad* has acted as a clear conduit for its members to express their ideological fervour.

The *jihad* is a popular discourse of Hamas' co-founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. Yassin states, 'There is a misconception in the world of the meaning of the word jihad; it comes from juhud and it means effort...I can be a teacher and be practicing jihad, I can be a builder and be practising jihad and I can be a fighter...therefore everything in life is jihad.'¹⁴⁹ In this interpretation of *jihad*, it is a duty devolved upon individual Muslims and consequently, as Yassin continues, '...those who are convinced of his cause – fight with him, those who are not convinced do not. The announcement of jihad is a personal choice.'¹⁵⁰ Hamas preaches *jihad* as a strategy of self-defence in which the defender represents the countries liberator and freedom fighter¹⁵¹. The practise of *jihad* therefore equates to varying degrees of commitment, with martyrs symbolising the ultimate sacrifice.

The symbolism associated to martyrs is a visceral symbol in contrast to the secrecy assumed by the cellular system. Klein comments that the Palestinian concept of the martyr is deeply interwoven in its '...ideological framework, which has sustained the Palestinian struggle for national liberation.'¹⁵² For example, Sheikh Izz al-Din al-

¹⁴⁸ Litvak, p. 4.

¹⁴⁹ Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, interviewed by Mariam Shahin, December 2001 retrieved 5 May 2003, from <http://library.massey.ac.nz/findit/databases/databasesaz.htm> (Military and Government Collection)

¹⁵⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*

¹⁵² Jean-Klein, I., 'Palestinian Militancy, Martyrdom and Nationalist Communities in the West Bank during the Intifada' in Pettigrew, J (ed.), *Martyrdom and Political Resistance: Essays from Asia and Europe*, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: VU University Press, 1997, pp. 85-110, p. 102.

Qassam's¹⁵³ death in 1935 while opposing British and Zionist forces is indicative of the Palestinian martyr signifying political self-sacrifice¹⁵⁴. However, Klein comments the determination of a martyr is ultimately not decided through self-sacrifice but on the animation of the martyr as a heroic nationalist, which is decided by the personal relationships in which the martyr was embedded¹⁵⁵. The cellular system limits this interaction. Consequently, a martyrdom operation provides an event witnessed by the community¹⁵⁶. The martyr through his act effectively authenticates the community's victimisation, humiliation and resistance to the occupation.

Hamas' nationalist discourse taps into the psyche of humiliation experienced by the Palestinian people using the spectre of Zionist expansion to make clear the hostility and racism of Judaism. Moghadam states, 'Videotapes of suicide bombers, as well as statements of volunteers, living martyrs, or families of suicide bombers clearly suggest that many Palestinians perceive a deep injustice done to them by a "Zionist entity" that deprived Palestinians of their land and continues to deny them a worthy experience on what they regard to be Palestinian soil.'¹⁵⁷ Palestine in this sense represents a *waqf* or inalienable religious endowment validated using Islamisation¹⁵⁸. Moreover, Palestinian territory represents Palestinian survival as a national identity and becomes an imperative to defend¹⁵⁹. Consequently, Israeli punitive measures, such as the destruction of houses, become increasingly symbolic and further acts to strengthen commitment.

The aim of Hamas' religious-nationalist ideology is to use symbolic rewards to commit the Palestinian people to its flavour of *jihad*. For example, martyrdom represents '...a transition that will put him [or her] alongside the other heroes of Islam and next to

¹⁵³ Hamas' military apparatus is named after Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, which is significant in its symbolism.

¹⁵⁴ Neusse, p. 85.

¹⁵⁵ Jean-Klein, p. 106.

¹⁵⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Moghadam, p. 74.

¹⁵⁸ Litvak, p. 12.

¹⁵⁹ Neusse, p. 19.

Allah.’¹⁶⁰ Alternatively, the reward may be spiritual satisfaction and fulfilment as a substitute for the inability to self-actualise¹⁶¹. The manipulability of Hamas’ religious core suggests commitment can be broadly re-defined to take advantage of political opportunities. Consequently, the dedication of the Hamas operative extends to martyrdom manifested through political self-sacrifice in most cases¹⁶².

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for commitment:

1. Hamas’ strategic tempo and the resulting ineffective overreaction by security forces reinforces the commitment of operatives
2. Decentralisation of control or volition helps justify the act to the operative
3. Selective targeting signifies the importance of the act to the operative reinforcing commitment
4. Hamas manipulates ideology to validate changes in official dogma to sustain popular support while operating within a fluid political environment
5. The process of recruitment determines whether the recruit’s level of commitment (*jihad*) correlates to the level of sacrifice expected by the organisation
6. Hamas recruits utilise training processes to gradually increase and/or maintain their level of commitment
7. Tactical variety increases attack effectiveness reinforcing commitment
8. Israeli repressive measures reflect negatively upon the integrity of the Israeli civil and military institutions reinforcing Hamas’ belief system

Hamas’ belief system is a flexible religious-nationalist ideology. *Jihad* translates the belief system into varying degrees of commitment, which acts to incrementally adjust commitment from uncommitted, to supporter and finally to operative. In addition to *jihad*, strategy and decentralisation of control act to justify various

¹⁶⁰ Kushner, p. 331.

¹⁶¹ Humanistic psychologists describe the concept of self-actualization as being when people are motivated to grow personally and become all they are capable of becoming. This concept originates from Carl Rogers 1951 ‘Theory of Self’ which among other things suggests, ‘...we have an ideal self which is the person we would like to be. For most of us there is a gap between the self-concept and the ideal self but we can live with it. For some people, however, the gap between the self-concept and the ideal self is so large that they become very unhappy and may need help.’

Source: ‘Personality Theories’ retrieved 10 May 2003, from

http://www.henley-cov.ac.uk/public/xfiles/general/progarea/Humanities/psychology/webct/gcse/crsnotes/Personality_theories.doc

¹⁶² Some martyrs may immolate themselves for economic or even pathological reasons. No system of recruitment is foolproof.

degrees of commitment with the most extreme demonstrations manifesting as martyrdom. Overall, commitment positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.




Figure 5: Hamans Systems Decomposition of Commitment

Popular Support and Da'wa

This section will primarily examine the extent of Hamas' popular support and how this translates into sanctuaries (see Figure 27). In addition, Hamas' welfare institutions are examined as key factors in generating sanctuaries to maintain cell effectiveness.

Hamas is a religious-nationalist organisation that depends mostly on a single ethnic Arab group and a grass roots social welfare system to generate popular support. Hamas presents itself as a movement for all Palestinian people spread across various social strata from the poor to the middle classes¹⁶³.

Hamas uses the concept of *da'wa* or the Islamisation of grass roots Palestinian society, to build home-based local economies through educational and social programs, as a platform to advance its ideology¹⁶⁴. The grass roots approach targets the poor and weak through funding, education, free medical and social institutions, such as youth clubs¹⁶⁵. This approach allows Hamas to access vulnerable Palestinian kinship networks¹⁶⁶. Subsequently, the impoverishment associated with the Gaza Strip has made it the heartland of popular support for Hamas¹⁶⁷.

Hamas popular support tends to run in cycles. During Hamas' unofficial participation in the 1996 elections it garnered 12 percent of the Palestinian vote. Polls since 1996 have indicated Hamas support varies between 13¹⁶⁸ and 20¹⁶⁹ percent in the OPT or from 400,000 to 640,000 Palestinians¹⁷⁰. Hamas supporters are Palestinian Islamists who according to Shikaki do not favour the re-interpretation of Islamic law to accomodate

¹⁶³ Litvak, p. 18.

¹⁶⁴ Mishal and Sela, p. 60.

¹⁶⁵ Alexander, p. 11.

¹⁶⁶ Mishal and Sela, p. 21.

¹⁶⁷ 'Israel Turns to the Gaza Strip', *Jane's Foreign Report*, October (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://frp.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

¹⁶⁸ Kristianasen, p. 34, 25n.

¹⁶⁹ Kushner, p. 332.

¹⁷⁰ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - General Statistics, Internet.

contemporary changes¹⁷¹. Shikaki states, ‘They have no consistent demographic characteristic, even though disproportionately more support for them is found among illiterates and the most educated youth.’¹⁷² However, during 2002 elections at Universities in the OPT Hamas garnered 70 percent support¹⁷³, which is unsurprising considering as Shikaki states, ‘Palestinian students like most Arab students tend to be more radical, defending ideals rather than compromises.’¹⁷⁴ Support for Martyrdom operations has ranged from between 20 percent in 1996 to 80 percent approval in 2002¹⁷⁵. Dolnik and Bhattacharjee note the average rate is between 35 and 40 percent¹⁷⁶. Shikaki comments that from 1994 to 1996 opposition to terrorism increased in line with increased suicide bombings, however the Oslo peace process during this period had a significant influence on how Palestinians interpreted these attacks¹⁷⁷. Consequently, while suicide bombings may influence Hamas’ support, its integration into the Palestinian community has been sufficient to generate Hamas sanctuaries.

Sanctuaries reduce the operational need for resources, provide rest and recuperation zones, and safe havens for training. Hamas’ predilection for grass roots reformation managed through its regional network of commands have predisposed the organisation to developing concentrations of support throughout both Gaza and the West Bank. For example, Katz comments on Bir Naballah in the Gaza Strip being a Hamas stronghold with relation to safe houses¹⁷⁸. The regional assignment of Hamas’ military apparatus gives some sense of these strongholds (see previous discussion on actors). However, a stronghold’s construction rather than applying to entire neighbourhoods, districts, refugee camps, villages and towns, can arguably be applied more specifically to the

¹⁷¹ Shikaki, K., ‘Peace Now or Hamas Later’, *Foreign Affairs*, 77:4 (1998), pp. 29-43, p. 32.

¹⁷² *ibid.*

¹⁷³ Eshel, Hamas Resists, p. 15.

¹⁷⁴ Shikaki, p. 32.

¹⁷⁵ Dickey, C, Ephron, D, Barry, J, Hosenball, M and Isikoff, M., ‘Inside Suicide Inc.’, *Newsweek*, April 15 (2002) retrieved 2 May 2003, from <http://library.massey.ac.nz/findit/databases/databasesaz.htm> (Military and Government Collection)

¹⁷⁶ Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 114.

¹⁷⁷ Shikaki, p. 35.

¹⁷⁸ Katz, p. 135.

social networks spreading out from sympathetic institutions such as Mosques¹⁷⁹. In addition to internal sanctuaries, an external safe haven operates in the Beqa Valley of Syrian controlled Eastern Lebanon providing Hamas operatives access to Hizbullah and PFLP-GC training camps¹⁸⁰.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for popular support:

1. Selective targeting increases the prestige of Hamas
2. The unpredictability of martyrdom attacks results in some degree of instability among Hamas' supporter base (-)
3. Hamas' translation of ideology into political, military and social policies sustains but does not tend to increase popular support
4. Logistics is fundamentally crucial to the funding of the *da'wa*
5. Hamas' success at carrying out attacks increases its prestige amongst competing influences for popular support
6. Repressive counter-terrorism measures ensures continued support for Hamas

In summary, the composition of Hamas is a reflection of the popular support generated from tapping into vulnerable local social networks through its welfare institutions. This encourages the effective integration of community and operative, and improves the understanding of selective targeting. The effectiveness of this integration and the legitimisation of the organisation are representative of the availability of sanctuaries and Hamas strongholds. While the tendency of Hamas support tends towards stagnancy, it retains a core support base for Hamas cells to operate effectively. Consequently, popular support positively influences cell effectiveness to a moderate degree.

¹⁷⁹ Mishal and Sela, p. 20.

¹⁸⁰ Ehrlich, R., 'State-Sponsored Terrorism: Terrorism as a Preferred Instrument of Syrian Policy' in *ICT Papers on Terrorism*, Herzliya, Israel: The International Policy Institute for Counter-terrorism, 2002, pp. 33-45, p. 40.

Recruitment and Martyrdom

This section examines Hamas' recruitment process, particularly its situational and character filtering mechanism (see Figure 27). In addition, Hamas' attrition rate will be analysed to gain some sense of filtering with regards recruitment rate.

The situational filtering and character identification mechanism identifies recruits with common experiences. The majority of Hamas operatives are Sunni Muslims of Arab descent¹⁸¹. They displayed the following three main situational and character markers; Palestinian nationalism, impoverishment and an affinity with martyrdom. Associated with Palestinian nationalism is humiliation symbolised by repression, an inability to self-actualise and ideological radicalism. The violence experienced by Palestinians from childhood through to adulthood, either verbal or physical at roadblocks, checkpoints or through protests develops a common background of repression¹⁸². Protests in particular are omnipresent in the OPT.

Since the start of the second *Intifada* of the 1,900 Palestinian fatalities, most have been male (95 percent) non-combatant fatalities (16 percent) concentrated among teenagers and young adults between 11 and 29 years of age¹⁸³. Radlauer comments these deaths result from '...an active Palestinian indoctrination campaign glorifying "martyrdom" – effectively encouraging boys and young men to confront Israeli forces and risk death even when there is no real likelihood of causing material harm to Israelis.'¹⁸⁴ While Radlauer's comments are arguable¹⁸⁵, they nevertheless suggest a protest cycle beginning from a young age, which further accentuates exposure to repression. In

¹⁸¹ Mishal and Sela, p. 169.

¹⁸² Moghadam, p. 74.

¹⁸³ Radlauer, D., 'The al-Aqsa Intifada – An Engineered Tragedy' retrieved 1 August 2003, from <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=440>

¹⁸⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Radlauer's comments are arguable because it is difficult to confirm any formal indoctrination campaign for young males by any rejectionist organisation. However, these activities do suggest the beginnings of a martyrdom complex for young Palestinian males.

contrast, the inability to self-actualise and ideological radicalism are self-apparent within tertiary institutions and professional organisations.

Hamas receives strong support from University students, as well as from professionals, including lawyers and engineers¹⁸⁶. Schbley identified most Shi'a religious terrorists did not come from impoverished origins but '...are by-products of migration of middle and lower middle-class college bound high achievers into economically stagnant urban slums.'¹⁸⁷ Therefore, students and professionals in the OPT become ideal recruitment candidates. For example, Alexander comments on Hamas' penchant to recruit from Universities, especially students in their twenties completing studies in electronics or chemistry¹⁸⁸. Universities in Syria, Yemen, Sudan and other Arab countries have also become recruiting centres for Hamas, which suggests that the ideological radicalism of these environments makes ideal recruitment incubators¹⁸⁹. While Palestinian nationalism generates recruits from broad backgrounds and locations, impoverishment in the OPT ensures a steady stream of recruits.

The numbers of refugee camps and urban slums in the OPT integrated with Hamas' welfare institutions facilitate recruitment conduits. Both high unemployment rates and levels of poverty¹⁹⁰ increase disillusionment, which according to Schbley increases their affinity to fundamentalism¹⁹¹. Invariably, Israeli closures that quarantine areas of the OPT, ultimately become incubators for recruitment. Consequently, the denser, violent, more economically distressed and religious nature of Gaza makes it a centre for Hamas recruitment¹⁹². In addition, refugee camps located in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon act as

¹⁸⁶ Mishal and Sela, p. 23.

¹⁸⁷ Schbley, p. 119.

¹⁸⁸ Alexander, p. 11.

¹⁸⁹ Ehrlich, p. 40.

¹⁹⁰ In Gaza, 81 percent of Palestinians live below the international poverty line of two dollars per day. Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Closures, Unemployment and Poverty Statistics, Internet.

¹⁹¹ Schbley, p. 120.

¹⁹² Katz, p. 65.

recruitment incubators¹⁹³. While impoverished areas become attractive locations for recruitment, a pre-requisite for Hamas recruits is an affinity for martyrdom.

Schbley comments that religious terrorists are risk takers and have an affinity for martyrdom¹⁹⁴. Hamas recruits willingly join the organisation; tend to be educated and militant with varying degrees of zealotness¹⁹⁵. Education and zealotness appear as two crucial identifying features, which determine whether the candidate trains as a living martyr or mainstream Hamas operative.

Potential martyrs are selected from outside the organisation on an as needed basis¹⁹⁶. Hamas recruiters look for devout Muslims with the mental capacity to carry out the act¹⁹⁷. For example, Kushner comments that the subject of dying for Allah is raised to potential martyrs and the reactions observed¹⁹⁸. Schbley's study indicates Shi'as with a high school education and high-degree of zealotness are the most willing to commit martyrdom¹⁹⁹. Schbley identifies religious terrorists with a college education as possessing the least affinity for martyrdom²⁰⁰. Additionally, they may lack psychiatric disorders, which Schbley suggests may be a causal factor in the transition between zealotness and self-immolation²⁰¹. The overall recruitment process comprises two-phases involving filtering and contact.

Regional recruiters identify Hamas candidates using particular situational and character markers as either potential martyrs or mainstream Hamas recruits²⁰². Background checks screen the recruit for Israeli connections before he proceeds to either martyrdom

¹⁹³ Alexander, p. 11.

¹⁹⁴ Schbley, p. 120.

¹⁹⁵ Schbley, p. 119.

¹⁹⁶ Moghadam, p. 68.

¹⁹⁷ Moghadam, p. 83.

¹⁹⁸ Kushner, p. 333.

¹⁹⁹ Schbley, p. 114.

²⁰⁰ *ibid.*

²⁰¹ Schbley, p. 120.

²⁰² Mishal and Sela, p. 78.

or mainstream supervised training²⁰³. The filtering and contact phases of recruitment optimises numbers in order to manage the recruitment rate. Eshel estimates there are approximately 150 Hamas operatives active in the Gaza Strip²⁰⁴. A similar number seems likely in the West Bank²⁰⁵. Consequently, the broad situational targeting of Palestinian recruits brings into Hamas' military apparatus a range of organisational and technical skills, and varying levels of zealotry representing an extreme and broad collective unit of Palestinian society, which shares basic knowledge and values that self-identifies with the disenfranchised Palestinian society.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for recruitment:

1. Symbolic targeting increases Hamas' prestige
2. The recruit's affiliation to martyrdom is an indication of the recruits degree of commitment (*jihad*)
3. Hamas' social integration into impoverished areas generates a constant flow of recruits
4. *Majd* cells provide background security checks on new recruits
5. Tactical variety increases attack effectiveness producing and attracting recruits
6. The recruit's affiliation with martyrdom negates survivability issues associated with counter-terrorism measures increasing the recruitment rate

In summary, the effectiveness of Hamas' recruitment process derives from its capacity to sustain its attrition rate. This requires measuring the replacement rate of volunteers exiting the organisation, which is somewhat problematic to calculate²⁰⁶. However, exit through death appears to be more common versus capture and imprisonment. Of 35 Hamas targeted counter-terrorism operations documented by ICT between 2000 and 2003, approximately 48 Hamas operatives were killed and seven captured²⁰⁷. Moreover,

²⁰³ Katz, p. 35.

²⁰⁴ Eshel, Hamas Resists, p. 14.

²⁰⁵ Numbers of Hamas operatives in the West Bank were not readily available. However, the West Banks division into eight regional zones would require at least eight five person cells, then a similar number for logistical purposes and additional Hamas operatives to staff the regional leadership positions. Consequently, the number of West Bank operatives would at a minimum number 100.

²⁰⁶ The intent of this calculation is to gain some sense of the efficacy of the recruitment process. Available data does not allow a more accurate calculation.

²⁰⁷ See Appendix B, 2nd Search.



of approximately 30 Hamas initiated non-suicide attacks for the same period there were approximately 18 Hamas fatalities²⁰⁸. These casualties represent in most cases mainstream Hamas operatives versus martyrs but lack detained, imprisoned and retired Hamas operatives²⁰⁹. However, recognising the expediency of Hamas' two-phase recruitment process and its capacity to generate recruits one can sense that its attrition rate is sustainable. Consequently, recruitment positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.

²⁰⁸ See Appendix B, 1st Search.

²⁰⁹ The only Figures that could be found of Hamas captures were from IDF reports and as previously mentioned these Figures are somewhat dubious and most likely represent supporters outside of the military apparatus.

Training and the Beqa Valley

This section will examine Hamas' formal and ongoing informal training processes (see Figure 27). In addition, attack success rate will be used to assess the effectiveness of these processes. This analysis will show that training reflects operational survivability, which contributes to cell effectiveness.

Formal training for Hamas recruits consists of separate training programs for mainstream and martyrdom recruits. Mainstream recruits have predominantly utilised Hizbullah and PFLP-GC training camps in the Syrian controlled Beqa valley of Eastern Lebanon²¹⁰. These camps are easily accessible to Hamas recruits recruited in Syria and Lebanon but require Hamas trainees from the OPT to infiltrate into Syria through Jordan²¹¹. Individual training programs are set up for Hamas trainees²¹² teaching tactics, explosives manufacture, communications and counter-intelligence activities²¹³. However, it is arguable whether all mainstream Hamas recruits need to undergo this formal training process.

Hamas carries out informal training, including the teaching of bomb-making skills. For example, Katz comments that Ayyash 'the engineer' taught Hamas operatives bomb-making and target selection skills²¹⁴. In addition, the continued ideological indoctrination of operatives is likely sustained through regular prayer, via the attendance at local Mosques whose sermons reflect the mood on the street. In contrast to mainstream recruits, the grooming of martyrdom recruits takes place through intensive local training programs.

Formal martyrdom training programs consist of repeating cycles of religious and anti-Israeli indoctrination combined with tasks that continually test the trainee's

²¹⁰ Ehrlich, p. 40.

²¹¹ Gambill, Internet.

²¹² Mishal and Sela, p. 158.

²¹³ Ehrlich, p. 40.

²¹⁴ Katz, p. 186.

commitment. This cycle continues over several weeks or months depending on the urgency of the attack²¹⁵. During this process, a spiritual trainer oversees the trainee's progress²¹⁶. According to Moghadam, classes involve three distinct phases: the glorification of martyrdom by emphasising the benefits of the afterlife; the assignment of tasks to test commitment, such as delivering weapons; and a process of cleansing, such as fasting²¹⁷. By using religious justifications, peer pressure and points of no return, the act is justified and the trainee psychologically prepared for the eventual operation²¹⁸. Moreover, trainees receive operational skills training, including counter-forensic techniques, infiltration and target acquisition²¹⁹. For example, Blanche comments on suicide bombers removing labels from clothes and scraping skin from their fingertips²²⁰.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for training:

1. Foreign relationships have added to Hamas' knowledgebase
2. Commitment (*jihad*) is developed during the formal training of living martyrs and continued informal training of mainstream Hamas recruits
3. Sanctuaries located within Hamas strongholds and in the Beqa valley are crucial for training

In summary, training produces high initiation and exit costs. The process of training living-martyrs and mainstream operatives gradually abdicates responsibility for the act from the organisation to the individual. While it is relatively difficult to determine the effectiveness of Hamas training, ICT reports show approximately 25 percent of Hamas' operations were intercepted between January 2001 and August 2003²²¹. Of these, just

²¹⁵ Moghadam, p. 84.

²¹⁶ Butler, L., 'Suicide Bombers Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope: An Interview with Eyad El Sarraj, *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, 31:4 (2001), pp. 71-76, p. 333.

²¹⁷ Moghadam, p. 84.

²¹⁸ Moghadam, p. 85.

²¹⁹ Katz, p. 186.

²²⁰ Blanche, Internet.

²²¹ See Appendix B, 2nd Search.

one living martyr was shown as intercepted from at least 31 martyrdom operations²²². Moreover, 12 bombmaking accidents were indicated for the same period²²³. The apparent skill of bomb makers and the success of Hamas operations in general suggests both formal and informal training have contributed to a technically and operationally proficient organisation. Overall, the training component positively influenced cell effectiveness to a high degree.

²²² This Figure might be low however considering the nature of suicide bombers, capturing them is problematic. This Figure was based on data retrieved from the 2nd Search in Appendix B.

²²³ See Appendix B, 4th Search.

The Cellular System of Hamas




Figure 6: Hamas Decomposition of Organisational Formation

Logistics and Attrition

This section examines the extent of supply sources in Hamas' logistics apparatus (see Figure 28). This analysis will show that these supply sources ultimately determine the utility of the strategy and capacity of the cell to remain effective long-term.

Hamas is a high-cost organisation that essentially reflects an internal infrastructure based on social institutions with supply networks supported by a local terrorism industry. Hamas' budget is estimated at between US \$30 million²²⁴ and US \$70 million annually²²⁵. Eshel comments that between 80 and 90 percent of funding is invested in social services, with the remaining 10 to 20 percent expended on military services, including recruitment²²⁶.

Funding for the military apparatus sustains the logistical network, including costs associated with maintaining weapons factories and smuggling routes. Eshel comments that the al-Aqsa Brigade's outlay for setting up a weapons factory was approximately US \$100,000 with monthly running costs estimated at US \$15,000 per month²²⁷. There is some indication such factories supply other rejectionist organisations²²⁸. These costs arguably translate to Hamas weapons factories producing anything from suicide belts to Qassam-2 rockets²²⁹. In addition to home-built weaponry, weapons are routinely smuggled into Gaza through tunnels. An IDF report details the businesslike nature of these tunnels, usually run by syndicates or families, built underneath houses and charging by the person or weapon for their use. For example, to smuggle a person

²²⁴ Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 125.

²²⁵ Kushner, p. 333.

²²⁶ Eshel, D., 'The Battle for Jenin', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

²²⁷ Eshel, D., 'The rise and fall of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

²²⁸ Eshel, The Battle for Jenin, Internet.

²²⁹ Dolnik and Bhattacharjee comment that suicide belts can be built for approximately US \$150 each, which makes the cost-effectiveness per casualty quite effective.

Source: Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 113.

between Egypt and Gaza costs US \$1,000²³⁰. To maintain Hamas' cost intensive infrastructure Hamas employs multiple external sources for both fund raising and weaponry purchases.

Most Hamas funding derives from non-governmental organisations, such as Islamic charities, and state sponsored donations. Dolnik and Bhattacharjee comment that of Hamas' annual US \$30 million budget 40 percent of donations originate from Arab nations, 20 percent from the OPT, 10 percent from Iran, 10-15 percent from the U.S and 15 – 20 percent from other countries.²³¹ Charity is an obligatory pillar of Islam allowing funding to be sourced worldwide. For example, principle state sponsors include Syria and Iran with others including Jordan and Saudi Arabia mentioned, but less extensively²³².

Internal weapons factories and external sources are the principal sources of weaponry for Hamas. IDF reports describe uncovered weapons factories and smaller labs producing mortar bombs, Qassam rockets, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and explosives²³³. Hamas or its weapons suppliers are technically innovative. For example, martyrdom bombs have ranged from bombs carried in duffle bags to backpacks to explosive belts with switches concealed in pockets and trouser legs. Moreover, Hamas locally produces explosives, such as triacetone triperoxide (TATP) used in the first generation of martyrdom bombs²³⁴. However, it is somewhat unstable. For example, Jackson comments that 37 per-cent of all fatalities from homemade explosives are the

²³⁰ Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports, 'I.D.F Forces Uncover 2 Tunnels Used for Weapons Smuggling' retrieved 2 September 2003, from <http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/036.stm>

²³¹ Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 125.

²³² Front companies transfer money using the internet, traditional banking methods, couriers or the *Hawala* system into local West Bank and Gaza bank accounts.
Source: Eshel, The Battle for Jenin, Internet.

²³³ Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports retrieved 2 September 2003, from <http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/dailyevents.stm>

²³⁴ Eshel, The rise and fall, Internet.

bomb-makers themselves²³⁵. This problem is somewhat rectified by importing explosives, such as C-4, RDX and Semtex²³⁶. Consequently, imported weaponry remains a crucial factor in Hamas' armed struggle.

Weapons are mostly imported from bordering countries and state sponsors, such as Syria and Iran. The Gaza Strip and West Bank each have their own smuggling characteristics, with Gaza utilising underground tunnels on the Egyptian border and sea routes²³⁷. Moreover, within the OPT innovative solutions are necessary to transport and store weapons, for example the transporting of suicide belts in paint cans or storage of weaponry in washing machines and Mosques²³⁸. The recent Israeli West Bank Operation 'Defensive Shield' (28/03/02-17/04/02) to dismantle terrorist infrastructures gives some sense of available weaponry. The operation uncovered nearly 2,000 Kalshnikov rifles, 23 weapons labs, six mortars, 93 heavy machine guns, 49 RPGs, nightvision equipment and various other rifles and pistols²³⁹. Overall, Hamas is well financed and well supplied.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for logistics:

1. Hamas' attrition strategy establishes attainable logistical requirements
2. Various foreign relationships have to some degree insulated supply chains from interdiction
3. The military apparatus' cellular system reduces overhead

²³⁵ Jackson, B., 'Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 24:3 (2001), pp. 183-213, p. 198.

²³⁶ Eshel, The Rise and Fall, Internet.

²³⁷ Gambill, Internet.

²³⁸ Israel Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports, Internet.

²³⁹ Israel Defence Force (IDF) Official Statistics retrieved 2 September 2003, from http://www.idf.il/english/news/jump_2_eng_300900.stm

4. The attrition rate of internal supply chains by the ISF disrupts Hamas' logistics apparatus (-)

In summary, the ISF interdiction of supply chains keeps sustained pressure on Hamas' internal logistics apparatus. However, Hamas' internal self-sufficiency via weapons factories, multiple land and sea supply chains and extensive foreign relationships provide a sufficient replacement rate to sustain its strategy. The abundance of arms uncovered during Operation 'Defensive Shield' reflects this state. Overall, the logistics component positively influenced the attack component to a high degree.

Intelligence and Dual-Use Cells

This section examines Hamas' counter-intelligence capability and capacity to produce well-developed operational intelligence (see Figure 28). This analysis will examine intelligence as an integral component in implementing Hamas' attrition strategy and maintaining the long-term effectiveness of the cell.

The *majd* counter-intelligence apparatus is a continuance of the MB's security section formed in 1983²⁴⁰. It operates within Hamas under its own command apparatus, gathering information on suspected informers in addition to performing religious policing duties²⁴¹. During the first *Intifada*, at which time Israel had an extensive informer network in the OPT; Blanche comments that 900 out of approximately 2,000 Palestinians killed were executed as suspected informers²⁴². In contrast, operational intelligence gathering is performed by both dual-role and specialised Hamas cells.

The highly policed and monitored environs of the OPT, Jerusalem and Israel render attack preparations highly problematic. Attack rehearsal's are risky in the OPT and in the case of attacks into Israel, virtually impossible²⁴³. Subsequently, as Eshel states, 'Hamas preparatory intelligence is also highly developed and careful surveillance of selected objectives is conducted prior to sending suicide squads to their designated targets.'²⁴⁴ Katz also comments on the use of Palestinian menial labourers working in Israeli cities or settlements for information gathering. For example, within Israel these intelligence cells might gather information on the web of neighbourhood buses, documenting security strengths and weaknesses²⁴⁵. In contrast, information gathering in

²⁴⁰ Munazzamar al-jihad wal-da'wa -The organisation of *Jihad* and *Da'wa*.

Source: Hroub, p. 40.

²⁴¹ Mishal and Sela, p. 156.

²⁴² Blanche, Internet.

²⁴³ Moghadam, p. 86.

²⁴⁴ Eshel, Hamas Resists, p. 14.

²⁴⁵ Katz, p. 149.

the OPT is regional and carried out most likely by strike cells with a familiarity of local terrain²⁴⁶.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for intelligence:

1. Integration into Palestinian society improved Hamas' intelligence gathering capability

In summary, *majd* cells provide a protective counter-terrorism screen. Their effectiveness during the first *Intifada* somewhat suggests their efficacy²⁴⁷. In contrast, the use of dual-role strike cells in intelligence roles as well as the use of specialised intelligence cells produces highly developed operational intelligence. The highly successful infiltration rate into Israel and settlements by Hamas operatives is typical of Hamas' proficient intelligence gathering capability²⁴⁸. Overall, intelligence positively influenced the attack component to a high degree.

²⁴⁶ Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

²⁴⁷ Additional information could not be found regarding the counter-intelligence aspect of the Hamas apparatus to comment further.

²⁴⁸ See Appendix B, 1st Search.

Attacks and Martyrdom

This section will primarily examine the doctrine of Hamas to give some sense of attack effectiveness (see Figure 28). This analysis will identify the tactical variety that the Hamas cell employs, which is a crucial determinant in mitigating risk and sustaining cell effectiveness.

Hamas' attrition strategy maintains the following key themes: to cause overreaction through selective targeting and to magnify the actual sense of individual insecurity. In order to meet these objectives the following three common attack patterns provide a sense of Hamas' doctrine²⁴⁹:

- Hit and run, and disengagement tactics
- The manipulation of stand-off range
- Firepower superiority

Hit and run tactics consists of approach, attack and escape phases utilising caution and surprise to ensure a rapid engagement and exit. IDF statistics show shootings, drive-by-shootings, shootings at vehicles from an ambush and shootings at towns and villages have accounted for approximately 30 percent of all Israeli fatalities since the start of the second *Intifada*²⁵⁰. Martyrdom bombings represent approximately 57 percent of the remaining fatalities²⁵¹. ICT statistics show that between September 2000 and September 2003 approximately 20 percent of all Hamas attacks were classified as ambushes and another 16 percent as infiltrations²⁵². During the approach phase the need for caution is paramount in view of the security force presence in the OPT.

Hit and run operations use local familiarity with terrain for infiltration and evasion purposes, and surprise in time and location to carry out ambushes on vehicles

²⁴⁹ These common attack patterns are based on attacks extracted from ICT reports. See Appendix B for an analysis of these attacks.

²⁵⁰ Israel Defence Force (IDF) Official Statistics, Internet.

²⁵¹ *ibid.*

²⁵² See Appendix B, 1st Search.

and infiltration of settlements²⁵³. The topography and demographic conditions of both the West bank and Gaza Strip tend to favour cellular based operations, especially when contemplating approach routes and runbacks²⁵⁴. The use of remote controlled roadside charges to disable vehicles followed by armed attacks, shooting ambushes on vehicles while in transit and the infiltration of settlements are regularly used tactics by rejectionist organisations in the OPT²⁵⁵. Hit and run tactics exploit the weaknesses of the security forces within the strike cell's area of operation, however economy in attack authorisations is a crucial operational control feature to ensure strategic maintenance.

Disengagement by Hamas strike cells is recognition by commanders of the sustained threat conditions imposed by Israeli counter-terrorism measures. Katz describes disengagement as a tactic to buy time, cache weapons and gather intelligence²⁵⁶. Disengagement economises the exposure of Hamas cells to continuing threats and allows certain logistical activities to keep up with the strategic tempo. Ultimately, this tactic prolongs the longevity of the strike cells.

The manipulation of standoff range determines the engagement range, which correlates to the degree of threat and resources allocated to the operation. Hamas predominantly uses close-in tactics of which martyrdom operations have accounted for at least 50 percent of all attacks²⁵⁷. These are high risk, low resource operations dependent on highly developed intelligence to mitigate risk during the approach and attack phases. Crucial during the approach phase is the infiltration of the target, such as an Israeli settlement or city.

²⁵³ Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

²⁵⁴ Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

²⁵⁵ Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Official Statistics, Internet.

²⁵⁶ Katz, p. 128.

²⁵⁷ See Appendix B, 1st Search.

Infiltration requires the living-martyr not draw attention. Disguises, including dressing as religious Jews or IDF soldiers are common means of urban camouflage²⁵⁸. In addition, a by-product from the living-martyr's psychological training is an outward appearance described by Schbley as Serene Disengagement (SD). Schbley describes indicators of SD as, '...a faint smile, distant look, lack of eye contact with the interviewers, submissive body posture, slow reaction, and what appears to be contentment or inner peace.'²⁵⁹ This appearance removes suspicion from the living martyr during the infiltration phase of the operation.

The attack phase consists of target acquisition, then execution. During this phase the living martyr is completely autonomous so that if '...they meet unexpected protective measures on the initially designated target they can change locations in favour of a less well defended point.'²⁶⁰ Martyrdom operations have favoured targeting transport, businesses and entertainment facilities with approximately 60 percent of attacks occurring at bus stops or on buses²⁶¹. In contrast to martyrdom attacks, rocket attacks on Israeli cities and settlements dominate high-end standoff range tactics²⁶². However, these tactics, which also includes some time-controlled bombings, account for only nine percent of all Hamas attacks²⁶³.

Firepower superiority contributes to mitigating the security force and settler threat. Attack weaponry has included various combinations of RPGs, grenades, Kalashnikov rifles and pistols²⁶⁴. However, selective targeting and combinations of hit and run tactics also allows surprise and initiative contributing to mitigating responses by armed settlers or off-duty military personnel.

²⁵⁸ Katz, p. 198.

²⁵⁹ Schbley, p. 117.

²⁶⁰ Eshel, D., 'Israel Refines its Pre-emptive Approach to Counterterrorism', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

²⁶¹ See Appendix B, 1st Search.

²⁶² *ibid.*

²⁶³ *ibid.*

²⁶⁴ Based on the examination of Hamas attack data in Appendix B, 1st Search.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for attacks:

1. A high degree of compartmentalization (secrecy) increased attack effectiveness
2. The safety of the Hamas operative is inherent in the targeting of civilians and in keeping with its attrition strategy, which increases long-term attack effectiveness
3. The *jihad* justifies the act as a personal duty
4. Palestinian popular support provides varying degrees of operational support
5. Training provides Hamas operatives with survivability skills applicable to Hamas' doctrine increasing attack effectiveness
6. The sustained pressure of Israeli counter-terrorism measures increases the complexity of Hamas operations reducing the number of attacks and/or increasing their reliance on martyrdom tactics (-)

In summary, the success of an attack qualifies its repeated use as a traditional tactic. These offensive tactics consist of combinations of infiltrations, ambushes and martyrdom attacks, in addition to defensive tactics, such as disengagement. Non-traditional tactics tend to carry an increased risk, require more resources and in some cases offer poor exposure. These tactics have consisted of rocket attacks, stand-alone bombings and vehicular hit and run attacks. However, counter-terrorism measures have increased the complexity of Hamas operations, which can arguably explain Hamas' predilection for martyrdom operations. Subsequently, the tactics employed by Hamas suggest a moderate degree of tactical variety with a high degree of attack effectiveness. Overall, attack effectiveness positively influenced cell effectiveness to a high degree.




Figure 7: Hamas Systems Decomposition of Operational Patterns

Counter-Terrorism and HUMINT

This section will describe the central counter-terrorism measures used by Israel's Security Forces (see Figure 29). This analysis will develop Israel's counter-terrorism framework in order to show the effectiveness of intelligence gathering mechanisms used in disrupting the effectiveness of Hamas cells.

Israel's military led offensive counter-terrorism strategy uses a doctrine of pre-emption anchored by timely and highly accurate intelligence. Control of counter-terrorism measures exists at legal, political and military levels. Legislation and supreme court control provides a framework to sanction particular counter-terrorism measures, including administrative detentions²⁶⁵ and interrogations. Israel uses multiple coordinated information gathering mechanisms to produce timely and accurate intelligence.

Information gathering comprises several essential intelligence assets including, HUMINT sources, Interrogation, Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and forensics. Israel's policy of targeted killings is a measure of the efficacy of these methods. In order to coordinate Israel's internal intelligence gathering mechanisms they have been centralised around the four following security force agencies²⁶⁶: the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), IDF military intelligence (*Aman*), IDF Field Intelligence Corp (FIC) and the National Police and Border Guard units.

The lead intelligence agency in the Palestinian conflict is the ISA also known as Shin Bet (*Sherut ha-Bitachon ha-Klali*). This agency provides internal security

²⁶⁵ State of Israel Ministry of Justice, 'The Legal Framework for the Use of Administrative Detention as a Means of Combating Terrorism' retrieved 2 August 2003, from <http://www.dci-pal.org/publications/a01/section2.pdf>

²⁶⁶ There is little confirmed data regarding Israeli's intelligence agencies and how they operate. Consequently, this research, attempts to give some sense of their effectiveness using documented counter-terrorism operations.

and intelligence within Israel and the OPT²⁶⁷. Israeli Defence Force intelligence (*Aman*) comprises military research and military collection departments. Military research is responsible for national intelligence estimates, such as targeting²⁶⁸. Military collection operates ELINT and SIGINT sources, collected by an Air force intelligence branch (*Shaldag* – Kingfisher)²⁶⁹. The FIC is the IDF's main intelligence gathering department and has several specialised units, including the *Mista'arvim* formations, which carry out deep insertion operations in coordination with Shin Bet or the IDF²⁷⁰, and the GHQ reconnaissance unit (*Sayeret Matkal*), which is a specialised IDF counter-terrorism force²⁷¹.

The National Police and Border Guard units provide both an overt patrol presence and additionally operate covert units. The Border Guard operates the *Yamam*, a minority recruited counter-terrorism unit²⁷². The National Police operate the *Matilan*, which specialises in surveillance around the perimeter of Jerusalem²⁷³. While each agency has unique intelligence-gathering capabilities, HUMINT sources remain Israel's primary intelligence gathering method.

Human Intelligence Sources are key actors in Israeli counter-terrorism actions. Yakob Perry the former Shin Bet chief stated: 'There is no substitute for a human source who can supply advance alert of indications, and there probably never will be.'²⁷⁴ Israel's dependence on informers is crucial within an environment where capturing terrorists is problematic. Recruitment of potential informers involves identifying vulnerabilities and then employing coercion using threats or incentives, such as prison terms or Israeli work

²⁶⁷ Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

²⁶⁸ Eshel, Israel Refines, Internet.

²⁶⁹ Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

²⁷⁰ Eshel, Israel Refines, Internet.

²⁷¹ *ibid.*

²⁷² Katz, p. 58.

²⁷³ Eshel, Israel Refines, Internet.

²⁷⁴ Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

permits²⁷⁵. Considering the difficulty associated with recruiting from within Hamas, informers may include members of the operatives kinship network²⁷⁶. For example, a family relation willingly assisted in the assassination of Ayyash ‘the engineer’ by supplying his cellular phone to Shin Bet, who then proceeded to wire it with explosives²⁷⁷. While Shin Bet appears the predominant operator of informer networks, the IDF have relied on interrogations for real-time intelligence.

Both administrative detentions and interrogations are crucial for providing ongoing and real-time intelligence. Israel’s Administrative Detention Order²⁷⁸ provides the legal framework for IDF commanders to issue six-month detention orders for Palestinians considered a threat to Israeli security²⁷⁹.

Israeli interrogations take place in detention centres or in the field as ‘on the spot’ interrogations²⁸⁰. Israeli legislation allows, in special circumstances, the application of physical pressure²⁸¹. Alexander regards these circumstances as ‘ticking bomb’ cases when recovering information is crucial in forestalling an imminent attack²⁸². In contrast, ‘on the spot’ interrogations are crucial during planned area incursions into the OPT. Operation ‘Determined Path’ during June 2002 was supported by ISA insertion teams extracting real-time intelligence gathered from ‘on the spot’ interrogations²⁸³. Each area searched employed interrogations to gather intelligence allowing new areas to be

²⁷⁵ Blanche, Internet.

²⁷⁶ The penetration of kinship networks by the intelligence services is a deduction made in light of the solidarity that exists among cell members.

²⁷⁷ Katz, p. 250.

²⁷⁸ The Administrative Detention Order (temporary provisions) 1988 operates in Israeli administered areas and the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979 operates in Israel. Source: State of Israel Ministry of Justice, Internet.

²⁷⁹ State of Israel Ministry of Justice, Internet.

²⁸⁰ Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

²⁸¹ Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

²⁸² Gazit, S., ‘Israel’ in Alexander, Y (ed.), *Combating Terrorism*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 227-259. p. 241.

²⁸³ Eshel, Israel Refines, Internet.

targeted, resulting in rolling area quarantines²⁸⁴. In addition, smaller incursions appear to be a standard tactic to plant various ELINT sources.

Electronic Intelligence and Signals Intelligence sources supplement, corroborate and sometimes supercede HUMINT sources. Short-term insertion missions of up to 72 hours into refugee camps allow listening and tracking ELINT devices to be planted. For example, a 2002 article in Janes Foreign Report comments that most intelligence in the Gaza strip comes from monitoring devices²⁸⁵. In addition, airborne surveillance platforms, such as Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs), have provided real-time intelligence through visual displays. For example, Operation 'Determined Path' employed UAVs at both Brigade and Battalion levels²⁸⁶. SIGINT devices in contrast allow the intercept of phone and fax communications²⁸⁷. The psychological effect of these measures almost certainly increase the paranoia and pressure on Hamas operatives. In contrast, forensic science provides a key role as a response to successful terrorist attacks by identifying organisations, terrorists and terrorist patterns²⁸⁸.

Israeli forensics have assisted in terrorist investigations through explosives and weapons identification, DNA examinations, fingerprint recovery and identification, document analysis and serial number restoration²⁸⁹. Almog and Levinson sight the case of an Israeli laboratory being the first to identify traces of the explosive TATP and describe its homemade characteristics and sensitivity to handling²⁹⁰. Moreover, the Israeli Police's 'open evidence' files, provide a central repository for forensic information,

²⁸⁴ *ibid.*

²⁸⁵ 'An Eavesdroppers Paradise', *Jane's Foreign Report*, March (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://frp.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

²⁸⁶ Eshel, Israel Refines, Internet.

²⁸⁷ SIGINT sources may be circumvented through a return to human couriers or the adoption of new technologies, such as disposable cellular phones.

²⁸⁸ Almog, J and Levinson, J., 'Forensic Science Plays a Key Role in the Fight Against Terrorism', *The Police Chief*, 67:October (2000), pp. 131-136, p. 131.

²⁸⁹ Almog and Levinson, p. 134.

²⁹⁰ *ibid.*

which then enables information comparison²⁹¹. The combination of multiple intelligence sources provides Israel with the capability to execute rapid and surgical counter-terrorism strikes.

Janes Foreign Report in a 2001 article comments that approximately 30 Palestinian leaders have been assassinated through targeted killings²⁹². This as Eshel comments suggests effective infiltration into Hamas controlled areas²⁹³. ICT reports show that approximately 31 helicopter²⁹⁴, bombing and shooting assassinations against Hamas operatives occurred between September 2000 and September 2003²⁹⁵. During these operations approximately 67 percent of those targeted were commanders, while the remaining were bomb-makers and low-level militants²⁹⁶. Israeli selective and surgical targeting through the coordinated use of real-time intelligence suggests a high degree of counter-terrorism sophistication. Targeted killings represent a disruptive capability that is extremely influential, both psychologically and operationally on Hamas operatives²⁹⁷.

Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for counter-terrorism measures:

1. Territorial and operational compartmentalization mitigate the information gained through counter-terrorism measures (-)
2. The horizontal dispersion of leadership reduces the efficacy of Israeli counter-terrorism measures (-)
3. Hamas' attrition strategy is inherently cautious mitigating the risk associated to cell operations (-)
4. Selective targeting of Israeli civilians engenders both revenge and urgency within the security forces
5. The operatives affiliation to martyrdom makes problematic their capture and recruitment of well-placed informers (-)

²⁹¹ *ibid.*

²⁹² 'Israel's Hit List', *Jane's Foreign Report*, September (2001) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://frp.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

²⁹³ Eshel, *Hamas Resists*, p. 15.

²⁹⁴ The majority of fatalities have been caused by helicopter strikes.

²⁹⁵ See Appendix B, 3rd Search.

²⁹⁶ *ibid.*

²⁹⁷ Moghadam, p. 84.

6. Hamas' popular support connected through close-knit social networks makes problematic the recruitment of well-placed informers (-)
7. Hamas' recruitment filtering process deters potential infiltrators (-)
8. Fewer operatives decrease the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures (-)
9. Multiple supply lines reduce the effectiveness of IDF interdiction (-)
10. Counter-intelligence mitigates the effectiveness of HUMINT sources (-)
11. Highly developed intelligence and tactical variety mitigate attack risk (-)

In summary, Israel's offensive strategy employs a military operated counter-terrorism doctrine of pre-emption, which at various political, legal and military levels sanctions aggressive intelligence collection measures. HUMINT sources, interrogation, ELINT and SIGINT, and forensics allow for the surgical interdiction of specific Hamas operatives. Crucial in this process are: the centralisation of information gathering supplemented by real-time response capabilities; the sophistication of the informer recruitment and handling process; and the myths, paranoia and suspicion generated from technologies. The ensuing psychological effects that these counter-terrorism produce ensure Hamas must organise and operate in a highly conservative manner. Overall, counter-terrorism measures have a negative influence on cell effectiveness to a high degree.




Figure 8: Hamas Systems Decomposition of Counter-Terrorism Measures

Lifecycle of a Hamas Operative

The lifecycle of a Hamas operative (see Figure 30) identifies the various interactions of components of cell capital and resulting feedback loops. The most significant feedbacks occur during recruitment, leading up to attacks and following attacks. The situational and character filtering process during recruitment filters out those least committed to the life of a Hamas operative. Martyrdom recruits then go through a repeating cycle of ideological indoctrination and irrevocable acts before proceeding to the final act. In contrast, the mainstream Hamas recruit enters a primary feedback loop comprised of attacks and informal training. Each attack sustains collective challenge and collective action. Following each attack, the operative's interaction with informal training reinforces both common interest and purpose. Counter-Terrorism measures provide the dominant means of exit.




Figure 9: Lifecycle of a Hamas Operative

Summary

This report has shown that Hamas' cellular components maintained a high degree of overall cell effectiveness. These results depict a high-risk security environment in which the formation and operation of Hamas cells requires high levels of compartmentalization formulated on Islamic precepts to offset asymmetric weaknesses. The functionality of compartmentalization was facilitated by the cells reliance on *jihad*, recruits requiring an affinity with martyrdom to generate commitment, welfare institutions to engender popular support and decentralization of control to manage supporter strongholds and martyrdom attacks.

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Appendix A: Research Definitions

Cell Capital: Compartmentalization

Compartmentalization: As a concept of terrorism, compartmentalization is best sub-categorised as territorial, operational and internal. Porzecanski defines compartmentalization in both the territorial and operational sense as the minimization of contact between terrorist cells, usually only through cell leaders and in which only the necessary information is supplied for the cell to remain operational²⁹⁸. Cells minimise contact to those assigned to their area of operations (territorial) and within their own cell specialisation (operational), for example logistics or strike cells. Internal compartmentalization refers to the minimisation of contact between cell members as determined by the ‘need to know’ philosophy. All three aspects of compartmentalization determine the cells operational security.

Solidarity: Tarrow states that solidarity is group recognition through a common interest²⁹⁹.

Communications Discipline: The ‘need to know’ philosophy ensures that select individuals communicate information or intelligence sensitive to the security of the organisation in a timely and discrete manner to recipients per operational necessity.

Cell Capital: Leadership

Leadership: Tarrow describes leadership as the use of symbols, whether cultural or constructed such as embellishment, the redefinition or offsetting of grievances with solutions in order to mobilize the movement’s supporters³⁰⁰.

²⁹⁸ Porzecanski, A., *Uruguay’s Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla*, New York: Praeger, 1973, p. 33.

²⁹⁹ Tarrow, S., *Power in Movement*, Cambridge, U.K; Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 5.

³⁰⁰ Tarrow, p. 122.

Strategy: The Clausewitzian definition of strategy states, ‘...the use of engagements for the object of the war.’³⁰¹ Clausewitz’s definition is used to define terrorist strategy within the context of this research.

Decentralisation of Control: Tarrow states, ‘Sustaining a movement is the result of a delicate balance between suffocating the power in movement by providing too much organisation and leaving it to spin off uselessly away through the tyranny of decentralization.’³⁰² Consequently, devolving varying degrees of control to subordinate layers is a means to sustain the balance of power in the organisation between leadership and cells.

Cell Capital: Commitment

Kiesler’s 1971 psychological study of commitment provides the basis for a definition of commitment in this study. Commitment is the ‘...pledging or binding of the individual to behavioural acts’³⁰³. It presupposes certain beliefs and involves a personal dedication to the actions implied³⁰⁴. The organisations strategy connects abstract beliefs with concrete actions. The greater ones commitment the more resistant ones abstract beliefs and past behaviour are to attacks³⁰⁵. Within this context, the following increases the degree of commitment:

- The degree of volition, particularly choice, given to the subject (the greater the freedom to act the more likely the subject is to infer his actions are his own, reducing pressure on the subject and increasing ones commitment)³⁰⁶
- The importance of the act for the subject (the greater the effort the greater ones commitment)³⁰⁷

³⁰¹ Gray, C., *Explorations in Strategy*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996, p. 4.

³⁰² Tarrow, p. 190.

³⁰³ Kiesler, C., *The Psychology of Commitment: Experiments Linking Behaviour to Belief*, New York: Academic Press Inc, 1971, p. 30.

³⁰⁴ Trigg, R., *Reason and Commitment*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 44.

³⁰⁵ Kiesler, p. 31.

³⁰⁶ Kiesler, p. 158.

³⁰⁷ Kiesler, p. 172.

- The explicitness and degree of irrevocability of the act (The more public or unambiguous the act the greater ones resistance to conform, and hence the greater ones commitment)³⁰⁸
- The number of acts performed by the subject (attacks on the subject of inadequate strength drives the subject to more extreme behaviours in defence of his previous commitment. Consequently, as his attacks increase his commitment increases)³⁰⁹

Ultimately, terrorists who are able to attribute meaning to the act make subsequent acts self-supporting³¹⁰. However, this component more than any other operates in a state of flux in response to feedback influences. Hence, it is the hardest to judge.

Ideology: An ideology details beliefs that are prescriptive and a product of social conflict that ‘...emerges when a section of society feels or perceives that its needs are not being met by the prevailing outlook.’³¹¹ Its objective is to be a persuasive catalyst directing ‘...the progressive movement of an actor from the uncommitted audience to the sympathetic audience and then to the active audience.’³¹² Its persuasiveness to make people act is a measure of its symbolic value to provide a substitute for unfulfilled needs.

Cell Capital: Organisational Formation

This represents the non-operational components of the organisation from which the cell is formed. It comprises three components including, popular support, recruitment and training.

Popular Support: Collective groups that each maintains varying degrees of commitment in support of the movement’s ideology and/or strategy. Taber comments that the

³⁰⁸ Kiesler, p. 16.

³⁰⁹ Kiesler, p. 88.

³¹⁰ Dingley, J and Kirk-Smith, M., ‘Symbolism and Sacrifice in Terrorism’, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 13:1 (2002), pp 102-128, p. 107.

³¹¹ Wright, J., *Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and The Provisional IRA 1968 - 1986*, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990, p. 35.

³¹² Wright, p. 166.

population is the key to the entire struggle, ‘...it is his camouflage, his quartermaster, his recruiting office, his communications network, and his efficient, all-seeing intelligence service.’³¹³

Recruitment: The recruitment filtering process is a mechanism to determine the commitment of potential recruits. It is a situational process that measures a level of despair and an internal process used to make character judgements. Generally, once the potential recruits experience with the protest cycle comes to an end he must then decide which organisation’s strategy appeals the most³¹⁴. For example, Irvin notes that militarists tend to be the most ethnic and suffer greatest from a loss of self-identity and self-worth whether from discrimination or other abuses; hence, they favour the armed struggle³¹⁵. In this sense, Irvin uses the following rationalization for joining a terrorist organisation: ‘Are the costs of an action likely to exceed the costs experienced with inaction? If anticipated costs are not expected to exceed the costs incurred normally, then the costs of participation roughly equal the costs of non-participation, and since the benefits of change clearly outweigh the benefits of inaction, rebellious collective action is undertaken.’³¹⁶

Training: The initial and ongoing acquisition of terrorist skills and process of indoctrination in order that the terrorist may adequately sustain the tactics required of the strategy. Training may be formal, through distinct training programs carried out once only or informal, through ongoing programs such as mentoring.

³¹³ Taber, R., *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*, St Albans, UK: Paladin Frogmore, 1965, p. 22.

³¹⁴ Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Part in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 187.

³¹⁵ *ibid.*

³¹⁶ Irvin, p. 37.

Cell Capital: Operational Patterns

Operational patterns represent the operational component of the organisation from which components participate or contribute to tactical operations. It consists of three components including logistics, intelligence and attacks.

Logistics: Within the context of terrorist organisations logistics can be defined as the detailed co-ordination of resources through supply interfaces. The supply interface comprises external and internal primary and secondary supply chains linking external suppliers with logistics cells and linking internal supplies with active cells.

Intelligence: Krizan defines intelligence as:

...being more than information. It is knowledge that has been specifically prepared for a customer's unique circumstances. The word knowledge highlights the need for human involvement. Intelligence collection systems produce data, not intelligence: only the human mind can provide that special touch that makes sense of data for different customer's requirements. The special processing that partially defines intelligence is the continual collection, verification, and analysis of information that allows us to understand the problem or situation in actionable terms and then tailor a product in the context of the customer's circumstances. If any of these essential attributes is missing, then the product remains information rather than intelligence.³¹⁷

Regardless of the commercial connotations in this definition, it makes the important distinction between information and intelligence and the need for human involvement in order to produce an actionable result. In this sense, this definition is applicable to intelligence gathering mechanisms within both terrorist and counter-terrorism organisations.

Attacks: This represents the doctrine and tactics of the terrorist organisation or as Gray simply states, guidance on how to fight and what the forces actually do³¹⁸. Tarrow states, 'Movements that continue to repeat the same actions run

³¹⁷ Krizan, L., *Joint Military College: Intelligence Essentials for Everyone: Occasional Paper Number Six*, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, DC, June 1999, p. 7.

³¹⁸ Gray, p. 5.

the risk of losing support and being ignored...'³¹⁹ Both intelligence and weapons variety and effectiveness significantly predetermine the tactics employed or tactical variety. In this sense, tactical variety reduces the risk associated to repeating same actions, consequently increasing attack effectiveness. In order, to judge tactical variety the doctrine and tactics of the terrorist organisation must be determined.

Cell Capital: Counter-terrorism Measures

The term counter-terrorism is often interchanged with anti-terrorism. It is therefore problematic to find consistent definitions of either term. The United States Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) uses the following definition:

Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of people and property to terrorist acts, while counterterrorism includes offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Thus, antiterrorism is an element of hazard mitigation, while counterterrorism falls within the scope of preparedness, response and recovery.³²⁰

However, both definitions involve information-gathering techniques that may be utilized for both defensive and offensive measures, for example anti-terrorism measures that introduces legislation allowing *Habeas Corpus* (the power to detain) or counter-terrorism measures that use technologies to track suspected terrorists. Simply, both counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism measures may produce actionable data. To avoid confusion this research will only utilize the term counter-terrorism, however it is recognized some measures may be considered anti-terrorism measures.

³¹⁹ Tarrow, p. 116.

³²⁰ Federal Emergency Management Authority, 'Anti-terrorism', (2003), retrieved 12th September 2003, from <http://www.fema.gov/fima/antiterrorism/>

Appendix B: Analysis of ICT Reports

Data extracted on 1st September 2003, from
http://www.ict.org.il/casualties_project/incidentsearch.cfm

The following search results comprised events each of which consisted of an event summary followed by an event narrative. These reports are sourced from the Jerusalem Post, Israel Radio, *Ha'aretz*, Israel's Foreign Ministry Website, ICT associates, *Btselem*, Reuters, the Los Angeles Times and Israel's Ministry of Defence.

1) 1st Search: Terror Attack, Hamas, All, All, All, 27/09/2000 – 01/09/2003

Summary of results based on researcher's analysis:
Total of 61 attacks

- Suicides – 50% (31)
 - Approximately 18 (60%) attacks on buses or at bus stops
- Ambushes – 20 % (12)
- Infiltrations/Shooting – 16 % (10)
 - Approximately 60 % believed to be suicide attacks based on single shooter attacks, however cannot be proven
- Other – 14 % (8)
 - Rocket attacks (50%), bombings, abductions and vehicle attacks)

- West Bank attacks – 30% (18)
- Gaza Strip attacks – 14% (9)
- Jerusalem attacks – 16% (10)
- Israel Proper attacks – 39% (24)
- Hamas Fatalities – 18 (non-suicide)

- Total Israeli Fatalities – 343
- Israeli Fatalities/Suicides – 271 (80%)

2) 2nd Search: Counter Terror Operation/Interception, Hamas, All, All, All, 27/09/2000 – 01/09/2003

Summary of results based on researcher's analysis:
Total of 35 operations (does not include targeted killings)

- Operations based on intelligence – 75% (26)
- Intercepts of Hamas operatives – 25% (9)
- Operations, Leaders Targeted – 37% (13)



- Operations, Militants Targeted – 57% (20)
- Hamas Fatalities – 48
- Hamas Captured – 7

3) 3rd Search: Targeted Killings, Hamas, All, All, All, 27/09/2000 – 01/09/2003

Summary of results based on researcher's analysis:

Total of 31 operations

- Operations, leadership – 67% (21)
- Operations, other – 32% (10)
 - Bomb makers, militants with unidentifiable positions in Hamas

4) 4th Search: Work Accidents, Hamas, All, All, All, 27/09/2000 – 01/09/2003

Summary of results based on researcher's analysis:

Total of 12 incidents (accidental explosions during the making of a bomb)